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Chapter 1
General introduction
Based on three essays, this Ph.D. thesis studies costly and truthful communica-
tion in the following situation: a sender (S) tries to convince a receiver (R) to
accept a project. To introduce the results differently than in the essays, let me
consider the following application: imagine that I am S and that I am asking you, R,
a letter of recommendation that is crucial for a job position in your field of expertise.
Before communication, both agents do not know the project quality. On the one
hand, they believe with probability α that the project is of high quality and will
raise R’s payoff by rH, and otherwise that it is of low quality and will decrease
R’s payoff by |rL| (with rL < 0 < rH). On the other hand, S earns s if R accepts
the project.
Based on some prior information (my CV, my thesis director...), we both have an ex ante
idea about my qualifications. You consider with probability α that writing me a letter of
recommendation will increase your reputation by an amount rH, and otherwise that it
will decrease your reputation by an amount |rL|. Once I get hired, if I prove to suit the
job position, the letter will affect your reputation positively, and otherwise it will affect
you negatively.
S has information that if understood by R, tells R whether the project is of high
or low quality. Therefore, if S wants R to accept the project, S may need to
communicate with R to resolve the uncertainty about the project quality. The
communication between S and R may either fail or succeed. The higher their
costly efforts to communicate, the more likely communication will succeed.
I have to spend time in polishing my essays and preparing my letter of recommendation
request. Conversely, you have to pay attention, decode and challenge the strengths and
weaknesses of these essays to find out whether you should write the letter.
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If communication fails, R does not learn anything about the project quality: he
still believes that by accepting it, he will earn rH with probability α and lose
|rL| otherwise. If communication succeeds, there are two possible outcomes: R
either finds out with certainty that the project is of high quality or that it is of
low quality.
After communication, R decides whether to accept or to refuse the project.
You decide whether to write the letter or not.
The first essay of the thesis extends the framework of the modes of communi-
cation model (Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005) by considering the case of social
preferences/S’s project quality incentives, as well as the one of a sender who is
uncertain about the value of a parameter affecting R’s payoff.
This essay shows theoretically that R’s communication objective and effort de-
pend on whether the project yields R a negative expected payoff before commu-
nication (NEG case) or a positive one (POS case).
In the NEG case, without any communication, R would refuse the project. R’s
communication goal is to identify and accept a high quality project. R is only
interested in finding out that the project is of high quality because it is the only
communication outcome that induces him to change his mind about his project
acceptance decision. Therefore, an increase in rH and/or in α raises the agents’
efforts. Moreover, since R never accepts a low quality project, an increase in |rL|
(his loss from accepting a low quality project) does not affect the agents’ efforts.
In the NEG case, you will accept to write me a letter of recommendation if and only if
after reading this thesis, you are convinced of my high quality. The higher your ex ante
belief that I have good qualifications, the higher your effort to get this information.
In the POS case, R’s communication goal is to identify and reject a low qual-
ity project. Therefore, the higher |rL| and/or (1 − α) (the probability before
communication that the project is of low quality), the higher the agents’ efforts.
Moreover, since R never rejects a high quality project, an increase in rH does not
affect the agents’ efforts.
You accept to write me a letter of recommendation unless you identify an important
shortcoming through communication. The higher your ex ante belief that I have good
qualifications, the lower your effort to get this information.
In the existing literature, S does not communicate if R’s goal is to identify and
reject a low quality project (in the POS case) because it is common knowledge
for both agents that R is ready to accept the project without any communication.
3I show that this result is not robust to very plausible extensions of the model.
First, S may communicate if his revenue is tied to the project quality or if he has
social preferences. The reason is that if S cares positively about R’s revenue, S
might be ready to communicate to prevent R to some extent from accepting a
low quality project.
I may care positively about your expected payoff because I might be a pro-social person.
I may also share to some extent your research center interests.
Another reason why S may communicate in the POS case is that he is uncertain
whether R is in the NEG or POS case. Putting it differently, S does not know
whether R would accept the project without communication.
I might not know to which extent this letter of recommendation might affect your repu-
tation. Therefore, I am uncertain whether you would be ready to write it if I do not exert
any communication effort.
This implies that in the POS case, S’s project quality incentives and S’s uncer-
tainty may both enable R to reduce his risk of accepting a low quality project
through communication.
In the second essay, a laboratory experiment tests some predictions of the first
essay by investigating the impact of rH and rL on real communication effort
choices.
In the experiment, the projects are represented by master theses. A thesis is a
high quality project if its grade is higher than 16.5 out of 20, and it is a low
quality project if its grade is lower than 13 out of 20. The experiment round
is composed of two stages. In the first stage, S has to read the master thesis
and to write a report to transmit information about the thesis quality. In the
second stage, R has to evaluate the thesis quality by reading S’s report and by
comparing it to the master thesis.
By measuring the participants’ communication efforts by the time they have
spent on their tasks, the experiment suggests that R pursues one out of two
communication objectives.
In the NEG case, R’s objective is to find out whether he would make money by
accepting the project: his effort depends positively on rH and does not depend
on rL.
In the POS case, R’s goal is to know whether he would lose money by accepting
the project: his effort depends negatively on rL and does not depend on rH.
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In the third essay, a field experiment studies some predictions of the first essay,
namely the impact of α, in the context of an information campaign about energy-
saving projects.
The information sent was controlled by the experimenter and each participant
was a receiver. Moreover, the participants’ ex-ante and ex-post beliefs about the
project quality (the likelihood of facing a high quality project) were assessed
through a questionnaire both before and after the information campaign.
The field experiment suggests that R’s effort depends on his ex-ante belief about
the project quality.
In the NEG case, R’s communication objective to enhance his chance of accepting
a high quality project: his effort increases with α, the ex-ante probability of a high
quality project.
In the POS case, R’s objective is to enhance his chance of refusing a low quality
project: his effort increases with the ex-ante probability of a low quality project,
1− α.
The experiment results also suggest that new information has lower influence
on posterior beliefs about the project quality if R ex ante holds strong views about
it than if he holds a less clear-cut view.
This essay therefore shows that discriminating the quantity of information sent
according to α, including whether R is in the NEG or the POS case, may enable
to reap efficiency gains on public information campaigns.
Chapter 2
Costly and truthful communication:
two alternative objectives1
Abstract
This chapter is about costly and truthful communication. I show that in a situa-
tion where a sender tries to convince a receiver to accept a project, the receiver’s
communication objective and effort depend on whether the receiver would reject
or accept the project without any communication.
If without communication the receiver would reject the project, his communica-
tion objective is to identify and accept a high quality project. His effort depends
positively on his gain of accepting a high quality project.
If without communication the receiver would accept the project, his communi-
cation objective is to identify and reject a low quality project. His effort depends
positively on his loss from accepting a low quality project.
JEL Classification: D8
Keywords: Communication; Information
2.1 Introduction
Communication is crucial in economic interactions. Acquiring relevant infor-
mation can help someone to make the best possible choices. Nevertheless, it
1 This research has received funding from the F.R.S.-FNRS. I am especially grateful to Georg
Kirchsteiger, Mathias Dewatripont, Marjorie Gassner, Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Estelle Cantillon, Jan
Potters, Jean Tirole and Petra Loerke for their very helpful comments and discussions. I thank
also all the participants of the ECARES seminar, of the ECORE Summer School, of the Toulouse
School of Economics and of the 4th Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Sympo-
sium for their interesting questions and comments.
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often requires that the agents exert a costly effort. Otherwise, the agents would
acquire all available information before each choice.
This chapter studies the following situation: a sender (S) tries to convince a
receiver (R) to accept a project through truthful communication. It may help
to better understand many economic phenomena: a citizen/consumer that reacts
positively or remains unconvinced by a public information campaign/informative ad-
vertisement; a worker that proposes to change a feature of the company product to his
manager; a recruiting committee that decides whether or not to hire a candidate; a politi-
cian that communicates to win over potential voters... As a reader of this chapter, you
might even consider yourself as a receiver choosing whether to read further or to stop
after this paragraph.
S will be rewarded if R accepts the project: for example, it increases the profits of
the advertising firm; it also helps the worker to get a future promotion, the candidate to
achieve his professional goals, and the politician to get elected.
Both agents do not know whether the project will increase or decrease R’s payoff.
Based on some prior information, they believe with probability α that the project
is of high quality and will increase R’s payoff by rH, and otherwise that it is
of low quality and will decrease R’s payoff by |rL| (with rL < 0 < rH). The
model studied is therefore not about signalling: no agents benefit from private
information before communication. For example, S and R do not know whether the
product has a high or low valuation for the consumer, whether changing a feature of the
product will raise or decrease the economic performance of the company, and whether the
candidate has the required skills for the job.
R cannot evaluate the project quality by himself before his project acceptance de-
cision. Nevertheless, S has information that, if understood by R, tells R whether
the project is of high or low quality. Therefore, S may need to communicate if
he wants R to accept the project.
Their communication may either fail or succeed. The higher both agents’ efforts
to communicate, the more likely communication will succeed. If communication
fails, R does not learn anything: he still believes with probability α that it will
increase his payoff by rH and otherwise that it will decrease his payoff by |rL|.
If communication succeeds, there are two possible outcomes: R either finds out
that the project is of high quality, or that it is of low quality.
The job candidate has to spend time to prepare his interview. Conversely, the recruiter
has to pay attention, decode and challenge the strengths and weaknesses of the candidate
to find out whether he should hire him or not. Similarly, the advertising firm/worker has
to exert an effort to convey information to the consumer/manager.
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In such a situation, I show that R’s communication objective and effort depend
on whether his payoff from accepting the project without communication is neg-
ative (NEG case) or positive (POS case). Let me first explain how communication
efforts differ in these two cases, and then why, contrary to the existing literature
(see the end of the introduction), the agents may communicate in the POS case.
First of all, note that R is only interested in a communication outcome that
induces him to change his project acceptance decision.
In the NEG case, without any additional information R rejects the project. R is
thus only interested in finding out that the project is of high quality; it is the
only communication outcome that convinces him to accept the project. R thus
exerts a communication effort to enhance his chance of accepting a high quality
project. Therefore, an increase in rH (R’s gain from accepting a high quality
project) and/or in α (the probability before communication that the project is of
high quality) raises the agents’ efforts. Moreover, since R never accepts a low
quality project, an increase in |rL| (his loss from accepting a low quality project)
does not affect the agents’ efforts.
In the POS case, without communication R accepts the project. R is only inter-
ested in learning that the project is of low quality, it is the only communication
outcome that induces him to reject the project. R thus exerts an effort to en-
hance his chance of rejecting a low quality project. Therefore, the higher |rL|, the
higher the agents’ efforts. Moreover, since R never rejects a high quality project,
an increase in rH does not affect the agents’ efforts.
In the NEG case, the recruiter hires the job candidate if and only if after the interview,
he is convinced of his skills. The higher the recruiter’s ex ante belief that the candidate
has good qualifications, the higher the time the recruiter spends on the job interview and
the more likely the firm hires the candidate.
In the POS case, the recruiter hires the candidate unless he identifies an important
shortcoming during the interview. The higher the recruiter’s ex ante belief that the
candidate has good qualifications, the lower the attention the recruiter pays during the
interview.
With respect to the advertising example, it can be considered that an increase in the price
of the product lowers rH and |rL|. In both the NEG and POS cases, an increase in the
price decreases R’s likelihood of buying the product. Nevertheless, in the NEG case, an
increase in the price lowers the agents’ efforts and R’s likelihood of identifying a high
quality product. In the POS case, an increase in the price raises the agents’ efforts and
R’s likelihood of not buying a low quality product.
Regarding the manager/worker example, in the NEG case, the use of a carrot (rewarding
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the worker if his project is both accepted and of high quality), contrary to that of a stick
(punishing the worker if his project is both accepted and of low quality), will increase the
agents’ efforts and likelihood of launching a high quality project. The reason is that the
agents’ efforts depend positively on R’s gain of accepting a high quality project.
In the POS case, the use of a stick, contrary to that of a carrot, will increase the agents’
efforts and likelihood of rejecting a low quality project. The reason is that the agents’
efforts depend positively on R’s loss of accepting a low quality project.
In the existing literature (see infra), R cannot communicate to avoid a low quality
project. I show that this result is not robust to very plausible extensions of the
model. First, S may communicate if he has an interest in the project quality or
if he has social preferences. The reason is that if S cares positively about the
project quality, S might be ready to communicate to prevent R to some extent
from accepting a low quality project. S does not want the project to be accepted
at all costs. This might be the case if the worker’s compensation is tied to the company’s
profits. Similarly, the advertising firm has an interest in the consumer valuation of the
product because it affects the company’s reputation and future buying decisions. Finally,
a job candidate can be intrinsically motivated because of the company social impact, his
carreer concerns might also make him worry that his skills fit with the firm needs.
Another reason why S may communicate in the POS case is that he may believe
with some probability that R is the NEG case. Putting it differently, S does not
know whether R will accept the project or not if communication fails. The worker
is for example uncertain about how large the potential benefits for the company might
be. The advertising firm might be unable to discriminate the communication between
consumers in the NEG and POS case.
This chapter extends the framework of the Dewatripont and Tirole’s modes of
communication model (2005).
It therefore differs from the economic literature on communication (for a review
see Sobel, 2010) of soft information (initiated by Crawford and Sobel, 1982) since
this chapter studies verifiable information: the agents do not benefit from private
information before communication.
It also differs from the economic literature on communication of hard informa-
tion (pioneered by Grossman, 1981 and Milgrom, 1981) because in this chapter,
S does not choose which pieces of information to withhold.
Besides, contrary to both the literature on hard and soft information, it is con-
sidered that communication success is endogenous to S and R’s efforts, and that
since communication requires time and devotion, the disclosure and absorption
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of information are both costly.
Moreover, it is built upon the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion in the
psychology literature (Petty et al., 2005) which considers two modes of commu-
nication: issue-relevant and cue communication. In this chapter, only the former
is studied: R carefully thinks about and examines information pertinent to the
merits of a project to determine whether he should accept or reject it.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, the setup of the
model is presented. In section 3, I show that there are two communication
objectives by considering separately the following two cases: I first discuss the
case of social preferences/S’s project quality incentives; and then I study the
case of a sender who is uncertain on the receiver’s revenue from accepting a
high quality project. In section 4, I conclude.
2.2 Model setup
There are 2 agents : S, the sender, and R, the receiver. R is the decision maker
and has 2 choices: rejecting the project, yielding zero revenue for both agents
and accepting the project that, if implemented, yields revenue s > 0 for S, but
might lead to a loss for R.
R can be of 2 types: he is of type 1, R1, with probability λ ∈ [0, 1] and he is of
type 2, R2, with probability 1− λ.
R′is revenue from accepting the project is either rHi or rL, i ∈ {1, 2}, with rH1 >
rH2 > 0 > rL. Parameters rHi and rL respectively represent R′is revenue from
accepting a high and a low quality project. R1 and R2 only differ in their revenue
from accepting a high quality project.
Let the parameter α denote the ex ante (before communication) probability of rHi,
measuring the riskiness of the project. It also represents the alignment of the 2
agents’ interests regarding the project: α ∈ (0, 1). If α is close to 1 (0), Ri and S’s
project revenues are highly and positively (negatively) correlated.
The sequential structure (presented below in Figure 2.1) is the following:
Stage 0: Nature decides Ri’s type2 and the project quality.
2Because of the S’s uncertainty on Ri’s type, Ri has private information that he cannot com-
municate to S. The game would only change if there was an additional communication stage
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Stage 1: Both agents simultaneously choose a costly communication effort to
resolve the uncertainty on the project quality: eS and eRi ∈ [0, 1] respectively for
S and Ri. S has information that, if correctly understood by Ri, tells both agents
whether Ri’s revenue from accepting the project is rHi or rL.
Communication involves increasing and convex private costs CS(eS) for S and
CR(eRi) for Ri, with
∂CS
∂eS
(1) = ∂CR∂eRi (1) = ∞. For simplicity, there are no commu-
nication setup costs and Ri’s (S’s) marginal cost of effort is equal to zero when
Ri (S) does not communicate. Cost functions CS(eS) and CR(eRi) are assumed to
be continuous and differentiable on [0, 1).
Stage 2: The agents’ efforts and pure chance then determine the communication
outcome j:
1) with probability αeSeRi, communication succeeds and the agents find out that
the project is of high quality, j = H;
2) with probability (1− α)eSeRi, communication succeeds and the agents learn
that the project is of low quality, j = L;
3) with probability 1− eSeRi, communication fails and the agents do not grasp
the quality of the project, j = F; as before communication, they believe with
probability α that the project is of high quality and otherwise that it is of low
quality.
Communication is more likely to succeed when S explains the project better and
when R pays more attention to S’s message.
Stage 3: Finally, without needing to understand S’s message for a proper im-
plementation of the project, Ri chooses whether or not to accept the project. Ri
chooses his project acceptance decision aji : the variable a
j
i is equal to 1 if Ri ac-
cepts the project after communication outcome j, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Therefore, S’s strategy consists of his level of effort. In contrast, R′is strategy
combines his level of effort and his project acceptance decisions after each pos-
sible communication outcome.
Let me end this setup by stating and explaining S’s and Ri’s utility functions,
respectively US and URi:
US =λ[E(Π1S) + βSE(ΠR1)] + (1− λ)[E(Π2S) + βSE(ΠR2)]− CS(eS)
URi =E(ΠRi) + βRE(ΠiS)− CR(eRi)
where R can signal this private information. Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) study the case where
S can communicate private information about the value of the congruence parameter α.
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E(ΠRi) and E(ΠiS) represent respectively R
′
is expected revenue and S’s expected
revenue when he is matched with Ri.
Ri may care about S’s revenue and vice versa: parameter βR (βS) captures the
extent to which R1 and R2 (S) take(s) S’s (R1 and R2’s) expected revenue(s) into
consideration.
Parameters βS and βR measure the agents’ social/other-regarding preferences.
If βS (βR) is strictly positive, S (Ri) has altruistic concerns. If it is strictly negative,
S (Ri) is envious. If it is zero, S (Ri) is selfish.3 Alternatively, βS can represent S’s
exogenous incentives in the project success; because of βS, S’s payoff from the
project depends on its quality.
Finally, it is assumed that − rH2s < βR < −rLs so that R1 and R2 both strictly prefer
to accept a high quality project than to reject it, and to reject a low quality project
than to accept it.
Figure 2.1: The sequential structure
3This chapter is built on the economic literature about social preferences (e.g. Bolton and
Ockenfelds, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fis-
chbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993; Sobel, 2005).
Even if the primary objective of communication is to transmit information, communication
may also generate emotions (empathy, attraction, envy...) and lead agents to judge one another.
One’s opinion of the other person is either positive or negative and may therefore involve social
preferences: an agent may care about the other agent’s payoff.
Moreover, there is evidence in the psychology literature about the possible effect of emotions
(such as guilt, envy, compassion...) on persuasion (e.g. Dillar and Peck, 2000; Nabi, 2002).
Agents’ feelings, moods and emotions can influence their evaluations of people and issues (Petty
et al., 1988).
The goal is to provide insights into the impact of social preferences on communication and
not to compare the effects of various models of social preferences. This is the same reasoning
as in Besley and Ghatak (2005) who study the interdependence of incentives and productivity
between the for-profit sector and the mission-oriented sector through occupational choice; as in
Driscoll and Holden (2004) who explain inflation persistence through social preferences; as in
Fehr et al. (2001) who examine the impact of fairness considerations on contractual choices; as in
Itoh (2004) who analyzes the optimal contract between a principal and an agent in the presence
of moral hazard and social preferences; or as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) who study the
relationship between incentives, leadership styles and the firm environment.
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2.3 Two communication objectives
To start the analysis, let me first look at R′is project acceptance decision in stage
3 after each possible communication outcome:
1) If Ri finds out that the project is of high quality (j = H), Ri strictly prefers to
accept the project (aHi = 1; cf. assumption that βR > − rH2s ).
2) If Ri learns that the project is of low quality (j = L), Ri strictly prefers to reject
the project (aLi = 0; cf. assumption that βR <
−rL
s ).
The classes of strategies playing aHi = 0 and/or a
L
i = 1 are therefore strictly
dominated or equivalent to a strategy playing action aHi = 1 and a
L
i = 0.
3) If communication fails (j = F) and if the project yields Ri a negative (positive)
expected payoff, Ri prefers to reject (accept) the project.
As it will turn out, R′is effort choice depends on his project acceptance decision
when communication fails. Therefore, an important threshold can be defined:
α∗Ri, the level of α for which Ri is indifferent between a
F
i = 1 and a
F
i = 0, is
defined as α∗Ri =
−rL−βR s
rHi−rL . This is formalized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 If α < α∗Ri, Ri plays a
F
i = 0; if α > α
∗
Ri, Ri plays a
F
i = 1; and if α = α
∗
Ri, Ri
is indifferent between playing aFi = 0 and a
F
i = 1.
Proof: see appendix A.1.
If Ri prefers to reject the project when communication fails (α ≤ α∗Ri), Ri only
accepts the project if he is convinced that it is of high quality.
If Ri prefers to accept the project when communication fails (α ≥ α∗Ri), Ri accepts
the project unless he is convinced that it is of low quality.
The variable aFi influences the agents’ expected revenue in the following way:
E(ΠRi) =
{
eSeRiαrHi i f aFi = 0
αrHi + (1− eSeRi)(1− α)rL i f aFi = 1.
E(ΠiS) =
{
eSeRiαs i f aFi = 0
(1− eSeRi(1− α))s i f aFi = 1.
When aFi = 0, Ri [S] earns revenue rHi [s] if communication is successful (with
probability eSeRi) and if the project is of high quality (with probability α).
When aFi = 1, Ri always accepts the project yielding Ri [S] an expected revenue
αrHi + (1− α)rL [s] unless Ri learns that the project is of low quality (with prob-
ability eSeRi(1− α)).
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The purpose of this chapter is to study the characteristics of equilibria involving
communication. Therefore, in the next two subsections, I show that there are two
communication objectives by studying separately social preferences/S’s project
quality incentives and S’s uncertainty on the receiver’s type.4
2.3.1 Social preferences/S’s project quality incentives
In this subsection, I consider that λ = 1, i.e. S is certain that he is matched with
R1, to investigate the implications of social preferences/project quality incen-
tives.
I will show that there are four possible types of equilibrium:
I) the communicating to accept a high quality project (CH) equilibrium;
II) the communicating to reject a low quality project (CL) equilibrium;
III) the no communication (H) equilibrium in which R1 always rejects the project;
IV) the no communication (L) equilibrium in which R1 always accepts the project.
The second equilibrium is the novelty of this chapter because it does not exist
without considering social preferences/project quality incentives.
I) In the CH equilibrium, the agents communicate and R1 accepts the project if
and only if he finds out that the project is of high quality (aF∗1 = 0).
In this equilibrium, R1 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = e∗HS e
∗H
R1 α (rH1 + βRs)− CR(e∗HR1 )
US = e∗HS e
∗H
R1 α (s + βSrH1)− CS(e∗HS )
Therefore, R1 and S’s optimal efforts are implicitly given by:
∂CR
∂eR1
(e∗HR1 ) = e
∗H
S α(rH1 + βRs)
∂CS
∂eS
(e∗HS ) = e
∗H
R1 α(s + βSrH1)
Note that the agents’ optimal efforts depend on rH1 and not on rL. This means
that the agents communicate to increase the probability of identifying a high
quality project, and therefore to avoid an error of type II (a false negative). They
4The possible equilibria when considering social preferences and S’s uncertainty on the re-
ceiver’s type together is presented in appendix A.2.1.3.
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are only interested in communication outcome H (they find out that the project
is of high quality). R1’s project acceptance decision when he learns that the
project is of low quality is the same as when communication fails: he rejects the
project.
Therefore, since the probability of communication outcome H is equal to e∗HS e
∗H
R1 α,
the higher the value of α, the higher both agents’ efforts will be.
II) In the CL equilibrium, S and R1 communicate and R1 accepts the project
unless he finds out that the project is of low quality (aF∗1 = 1).
In this equilibrium, R1 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = αrH1 + (1− α)(1− e∗LS e∗LR1)rL − CR(e∗LR1) + βRE(Π1S)
US =
[
1− e∗LS e∗LR1(1− α)
]
s− CS(e∗LS ) + βSE(ΠR1)
Therefore, R1 and S’s optimal efforts are implicitly given by:
∂CR
∂eR1
(e∗LR1) = e
∗L
S (1− α)(−rL − βRs)
∂CS
∂eS
(e∗LS ) = e
∗L
R1(1− α)(−s− βSrL)
Note that the agents’ optimal efforts depend on rL and not on rH1. This means
that the agents communicate to increase the probability of correctly identifying
a low quality project, and therefore to avoid an error of type I (a false positive).
They are only interested in communication outcome L (they find out that the
project is of low quality). R1’s project acceptance decision when he learns that
the project is of high quality is the same as when communication fails: he accepts
the project.
Therefore, since the probability of communication outcome L is equal to e∗LS e
∗L
R1(1−
α), the higher the value of α, the lower both agents’ efforts will be.
This equilibrium is in certain respects the opposite of the CH equilibrium: R1
communicates to avoid getting rL and not to earn rH1. In this equilibrium, S pre-
vents R1 to some extent from accepting a low quality project. S does not want
the project to be accepted by R1 at all costs.
III) In the H equilibrium, S and R1 do not communicate (e∗S = e
∗
R1 = 0) and R1
always rejects the project (aF∗1 = 0).
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In this equilibrium, R1 and S’s utilities are zero.
IV) In the L equilibrium, S and R1 do not communicate (e∗S = e
∗
R1 = 0) and R1
always accepts the project (aF∗1 = 1).
In this equilibrium, R1 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = αrH1 + (1− α)rL + βRs
US = s + βS(αrH1 + (1− α)rL)
Let me now state the conditions of existence of the equilibria.
Proposition 1 I) The communicating to accept a high quality project (CH) equilibrium
exists provided that α ≤ α∗R1 and βS > − srH1 .
II) The communicating to reject a low quality project (CL) equilibrium exists provided
that α ≥ α∗R1 and βS > s−rL .
III) The no communication (H) equilibrium in which R1 always rejects the project exists
provided that α ≤ α∗R1.
IV) The no communication (L) equilibrium in which R1 always accepts the project exists
provided that α ≥ α∗R1.
Proof: see appendix A.2.1.1.
Let me comment the conditions of existence not explained by Lemma 1.
I) The CH equilibrium can only exist if βS > − srH . S should not care too nega-
tively about R1’s revenue: when R1 accepts a project of high quality, S benefits
from a revenue s but may suffer from negative concerns βSrH if βS is negative.
S’s expected payoff from the project should be positive. Otherwise, if α ≤ α∗R1, S
does not communicate implying that R1 never accepts the project.
II) The CL equilibrium cannot exist if βS ≤ s−rL . In the CL equilibrium, S sacri-
fices part of his expected revenue (e∗LS e
∗L
R1(1− α)s) to prevent R1 to some extent
from accepting a low quality project (−e∗LS e∗LR1(1− α)rL). Interpreting the param-
eter βS as S’s social preferences means that S’s altruistic concerns must dominate
his interest about his own expected revenue (βS > s−rL ). Alternatively, it means
that S’s project quality incentives should be sufficiently important to cause him
to fear a low quality project.5
5One could argue that communication is ceteris paribus more likely to succeed if the project
is of low quality than if it is of high quality. This would decrease the agents’ efforts in the CH
equilibrium and increase the agents’ efforts in the CL equilibrium. There would not necessarily
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To illustrate the effect of S’s social preferences/project quality incentives on his
efforts, Figure 2.2 depicts S’s equilibrium effort for every possible value of α
in two situations: βS = 0.6 (dashed curve) and βS = 0 (solid curve).6 In both
situations, I consider that CR(eR1) is equal to
(eR1)3
3 if eR1 < 1 and to ∞ otherwise,
CS(eS) is equal to
(eS)2
2 if eR1 < 1 and to ∞ otherwise, rH1 = 2, rL = −2, βR = 0
and s = 0.5.
Figure 2.2: S’s social preferences/project quality incentives and effort
Figure 2.2 shows that in the NEG case (accepting the project before communi-
cation would yield R1 a negative payoff), it is the CH equilibrium that prevails
in both situations (e∗HS = α
3rH1(s + βSrH1)2). Therefore, the higher the value
of α, rH1 and/or βS, the higher S’s effort will be. R1 exerts an effort to get rH1
(the ex ante probability that the project is of high quality is equal to α) and S
communicates therefore to convince R1 that the project is of high quality.
In the POS case, the situation with social preferences/S’s project quality incen-
tives (βS = 0.6) is completely different from the one without social preferences
(βS = 0).
When S does not care about R1’s project revenue (βS = 0), there cannot be any
communication in equilibrium. S has the real authority, he does not communi-
cate and R1 always accepts the project.
When S cares about R1’s project revenue (βS = 0.6), it is the CL equilibrium that
prevails (e∗LS = (1− α)3(−rL)(−s− βSrL)2). Therefore, the higher the value of α
be a downward discontinuity in both agents’ efforts between the CH and the CL equilibria when
α crosses α∗R1 (if βR βS < 1 and if S and/or R’s efforts are not maximal in the CL equilibrium
when α = α∗R1). Moreover, this would not affect any equilibria conditions of existence since R’s
project acceptance decision for each communication outcome aj1 does not depend on the agents’
efforts.
6In this graph, I disregard the no communication equilibrium when a Pareto-dominant equi-
librium exists. The corresponding graph for R1’s effort is presented in appendix A.3.2.1.
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and/or rL, the lower S’s effort will be. R1 exerts an effort to avoid rL (the ex ante
probability that the project is of low quality is equal to 1− α) and S therefore
communicates to prevent R1 to some extent from accepting a low quality project.
Moreover, there is a downward discontinuity in both agents’ efforts between the
CH and the CL equilibria when α crosses α∗R1. This is the case if βR βS < 1 and
if S and/or R’s efforts are not maximal in the CL equilibrium when α = α∗R1
(proof: see appendix A.3.1). This can be explained through S’s marginal revenue
of communication. First, remember that βS should be strictly higher than s−rL for
S to be willing to communicate. Second, notice that the higher the value of βR,
the higher (lower) S’s effort will be in the CH (CL) equilibrium when α = α∗R1.
2.3.2 Uncertainty
In this subsection, I consider that βR = βS = 0 to investigate the implications of
S’s uncertainty on R’s type.
I will show that there are five possible types of equilibrium.
I) In the CHH equilibrium, S, R1 and R2 communicate to accept a high quality
project (aF∗1 = a
F∗
2 = 0).
In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = e
∗H
S e
∗H
R1 αrH1 − CR(e∗HR1 )
UR2 = e
∗H
S e
∗H
R2 αrH2 − CR(e∗HR2 )
US = e∗HS
[
λe∗HR1 + (1− λ)e∗HR2
]
αs− CS(e∗HS )
Therefore, R1, R2 and S’s optimal efforts are implicitly given by:
∂CR
∂eR1
(e∗HR1 ) = e
∗H
S αrH1
∂CR
∂eR2
(e∗HR2 ) = e
∗H
S αrH2
∂CS
∂eS
(e∗HS ) =
[
λe∗HR1 + (1− λ)e∗HR2
]
αs
The agents’ optimal efforts depend on rH1 and rH2 and not on rL. Note also that
R1 and R2’s efforts are interdependent because of S’s effort choice.
II) In the CLH equilibrium, R1 communicates to reject a low quality project and
R2 communicates to accept a high quality project (aF∗1 = 1 and a
F∗
2 = 0).
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In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = αrH1 + (1− α)(1− e∗LHS e∗LR1)rL − CR(e∗LR1)
UR2 = e
∗LH
S e
∗H′
R2 αrH2 − CR(e∗H
′
R2 )
US = s
[
α
(
λ+ (1− λ)e∗LHS e∗H
′
R2
)
+ (1− α)λ
(
1− e∗LHS e∗LR1
)]
− CS(e∗LHS )
Therefore, the agents’ optimal efforts are implicitly given by:
∂CR
∂eR1
(e∗LR1) = e
∗LH
S (1− α)(−rL)
∂CR
∂eR2
(e∗H
′
R2 ) = e
∗LH
S αrH2
∂CS
∂eS
(e∗LHS ) = (1− λ)e∗H
′
R2 αs− λe∗LR1(1− α)s
Note that R1’s optimal effort depends on rL and not on rH1.
The uncertainty on the receiver’s communication objective explains why S com-
municates in this equilibrium. S is uncertain that he is matched with a receiver
that would accept the project without communication. If S knew before commu-
nication that he is matched with R1, S would not communicate.
No equilibrium in which R1 and R2 both communicate to reject a low quality
project (aF1 = a
F
2 = 1) can exist. The reason is that if S knows with certainty
that he is matched with a receiver who accepts the project when communication
fails, S strictly prefers not to communicate.
III) In the HH equilibrium, S, R1 and R2 do not communicate (e∗S = e
∗
R1 = e
∗
R2 =
0), and R1 and R2 always reject the project (aF∗1 = a
F∗
2 = 0).
In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are zero.
IV) In the LH equilibrium, S, R1 and R2 do not communicate (e∗S = e
∗
R1 = e
∗
R2 =
0), R1 always accepts the project and R2 always rejects the project (aF∗1 = 1 and
aF∗2 = 0).
In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = αrH1 + (1− α)rL
UR2 = 0
US = λs
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V) In the LL equilibrium, S, R1 and R2 do not communicate (e∗S = e
∗
R1 = e
∗
R2 = 0),
and R1 and R2 always accept the project (aF∗1 = a
F∗
2 = 1).
In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = αrH1 + (1− α)rL
UR2 = αrH2 + (1− α)rL
US = s
A crucial threshold must be defined before developing the conditions of exis-
tence of the equilibria. Let α∗S =
λe∗LR1
(1−λ)e∗H′R2 +λe∗LR1
. If R1 exerts a strictly positive
effort e∗LR1 with a
F
1 = 1, if R2 exerts a strictly positive effort e
∗H′
R2 with a
F
2 = 0, the
threshold α∗S represents the minimum parameter α above which S strictly prefers
to communicate.
Proposition 2 I) The CHH equilibrium exists provided that α ≤ α∗R1 .
II) The CLH equilibrium exists provided that max
{
α∗R1 ; α
∗
S
}
≤ α ≤ α∗R2 .
III) The HH equilibrium exists provided that α ≤ α∗R2 .
IV) The LH equilibrium exists provided that α∗R1 ≤ α ≤ α∗R2 .
V) The LL equilibrium exists provided that α ≥ α∗R1 .
Proof: see appendix A.2.1.2.
I) The CHH equilibrium exists if and only if R1 does not deviate from commu-
nicating to accept a high quality project (aF1 = 0) to communicating to reject a
low quality project (aF1 = 1): α ≤ α∗R1 (see Lemma 1). Since α∗R1 is lower than α∗R2 ,
the maximum value of α under which R1 does not deviate to aF1 = 1 is lower
than the maximum value of α under which R2 does not deviate to aF2 = 1. This
explains why a CHL equilibrium, in which R1 communicates to accept a high
quality project and R2 communicates to reject a low quality project, does not
exist.
There are no other conditions of existence since S (R1 and R2) always has (have)
some interest in communicating if R1 and R2 (S) communicate(s). Remember
that:
- R1/R2/S’s marginal cost of effort is zero if he does not communicate;
- there are no setup costs of communication; and that
- S’s (R1’s/R2’s) marginal revenue of communication is strictly positive if R1 and
R2 (S) communicate(s).
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II) I will comment the only condition of existence of the CLH equilibrium that
is not explained by Lemma 1.
The condition α∗S ≤ α is necessary for S not to deviate to a zero effort strategy.
Remember first that S communicates in this equilibrium because he wants to
convince R2 that the project is of high quality (aF2 = 0) and not because he wants
to enable R1 to reject a low quality project (aF1 = 1).
In this equilibrium,
- if S is matched with R1 (with probability λ), if communication succeeds with
R1 (with probability e∗LHS e
∗L
R1) and if R1’s revenue from accepting the project is
negative (with probability 1− α), then S does not earn revenue s;
- if S is matched with R2 (with probability 1− λ), if communication succeeds
with R2 (with probability e∗LHS e
∗H′
R2 ) and if R2’s revenue from accepting the project
is positive (with probability α), then S earns revenue s.
Note that the higher α, the lower the probability that S does not earn revenue s
if S is matched with R1 and the higher the probability that S earns revenue s if S
is matched with R2.
S is thus prepared to communicate if in expectation, S’s gain from communicat-
ing and being matched with R2 is higher than S’s loss from communicating and
being matched with R1.7
To illustrate the effect of S’s uncertainty on his effort, Figure 2.3 compares S’s
equilibrium effort for every possible value of α in a situation with uncertainty
(λ = 0.25 and rH1 = 3, solid curve), to one without uncertainty (λ = 1 and
rH1 = 1.5, dashed curve).8 In both situations, I consider that CR(eRi) is equal to
(eRi)2
2 if eRi < 1 and to ∞ otherwise, CS(eS) is equal to
(eS)3
3 and to ∞ otherwise,
rH2 = 1, rL = −2 and s = 1.5. Therefore, the receiver’s revenue from accepting
a high quality project is in expectation the same in both situations.
Figure 2.3 shows that if S is certain that he is matched with R1 (λ = 1), for the
same reasons as explained for Figure 2.2, the CH equilibrium (e∗HS = α
2srH1)
prevails in the NEG case (α ≤ α∗R1(rH1 = 1.5)) and there cannot be any commu-
nication in equilibrium in the POS case (α > α∗R1(rH1 = 1.5)).
Let me explain S’s effort if S is uncertain that he is matched with R1 (λ = 0.25).
7If communication is ceteris paribus more likely to succeed when the project is of low quality
than when it is of high quality, it would decrease the agents’ efforts in both the CHH and CLH
equilibria and it would raise α∗S.
8In this graph, I disregard the no communication equilibrium when a Pareto-dominant equi-
librium exists. The corresponding graph for R1 and R2’s efforts is presented in appendix A.3.2.2.
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Figure 2.3: S’s uncertainty and effort
If both R1 and R2 are in the NEG case (α ≤ α∗R1(rH1 = 3)), the CHH equilibrium
prevails (e∗HS = α
2s(λrH1 + (1− λ)rH2)). R1 and R2 exert an effort to respectively
get rH1 and rH2 and S therefore communicates to convince R1 and R2 that the
project is of high quality.
If R1 is the POS case and R2 is in the NEG case (α∗R1(rH1 = 3) ≤ α ≤ α∗R2),
contrary to R2, R1 is ready to accept the project when communication fails.
Therefore, if S could distinguish R1 from R2, S would be willing to communi-
cate with R2 but not with R1. S wants to convince R2 that the project is of high
quality (with probability α), but he does not want to prevent R2 from accepting
a low quality project (with probability 1− α). The higher α, the higher S’s ben-
efit from communicating with R2 ((1− λ)eSeR2αs) and the lower S’s loss from
communicating with R1(−λeSeR2(1− α)s).
Therefore, if α∗R1 ≤ α ≤ α∗S, S does not communicate because S’s benefit from
communicating with R2 is lower than his loss from communicating with R1. If
α∗S ≤ α ≤ α∗R2, the CLH equilibrium prevails: S is willing to communicate and
the higher the value of α, the higher S’s effort will be (e∗LHS = α
2(1− λ)rH2s +
(1− α)2λrLs). If both R1 and R2 are in the POS case (α ≥ α∗R2), S is not willing
to communicate because both R1 and R2 are ready to accept the project without
any communication.
2.4 Conclusion
In a situation where a sender tries to convince a receiver to accept a project
through truthful communication, I have shown that there are two communica-
tion objectives.
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If without any additional information the receiver would reject the project, his
communication effort depends positively on his gain of accepting a high quality
project and on the ex ante probability that the project is of high quality. He
communicates to enhance his chance of accepting a high quality project and to
avoid a type II error, a false negative.
If without any additional information the receiver would accept the project, his
effort depends positively on the loss from accepting a low quality project and
on the ex ante probability that the project is of low quality. He communicates to
enhance his chance of rejecting a low quality project and to avoid a type I error,
a false positive.
The next research step is to carry out an economic experiment to test these
predictions, namely whether there are two communication objectives. A possible
direction for future research is to extend the model to a buyers-sellers situation
to give insights on the price and communication strategies in markets (building
on the models of Johnson and Myatt, 2006; Lewis and Sappington, 1994; and
Moscarini and Ottaviani 2001; for a review, see Bagwell, 2007; or DellaVigna and
Gentzkow, 2010).
Chapter 3
To win or not to lose: an experiment
on communication efforts1
Abstract
Our laboratory experiment investigates and confirms some predictions of the
models of Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) and of chapter 2 of the thesis about
costly and truthful communication. We measure the impact of monetary incen-
tives on real communication effort choices.
The experiment gives evidence that, in a situation where a sender tries to con-
vince a receiver to accept a project, the receiver may pursue one out of two
communication goals.
On the one hand, if without any communication the receiver would refuse the
project, his communication objective is to identify and accept a high quality
project. His effort depends positively on the earning he wins when accepting a
high quality project.
On the other hand, if without any communication the receiver would accept
the project, his communication objective is to identify and refuse a low quality
project. His effort depends positively on his loss when accepting a low quality
project.
JEL Classifications: C70, C91, D8
1 This research is joint work with Régine Kolinsky, psychology researcher at Université li-
bre de Bruxelles (FRS-FNRS, UNESCOG CRCN). It has received funding from the FNRS and
from the National Bank of Belgium (Banque Nationale de Belgique). We are especially grateful
to Mathias Dewatripont, José Junca De Morais, Georg Kirchsteiger, Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Estelle
Cantillon and Jan Potters for their very helpful comments and discussions. We also thank all
the participants of the ECARES seminar, of the Toulouse School of Economics seminar, of the
Alhambra Experimental Workshop in Granada and of the Barcelona Jamboree for their inter-
esting questions and comments. Finally, we thank Michael Vandycke for his excellent work in
developing the experiment program.
23
24 CHAPTER 3.
3.1 Introduction
Acquiring relevant information can help someone to make the best possible
choices. Nevertheless, grasping and conveying information requires a costly
effort. Better understanding costly and truthful communication efforts is theo-
retically studied by Dewatripont and Tirole (2005), and by chapter 2 of the thesis.
Some predictions of these models are tested in this chapter through a laboratory
experiment.
The experiment studies the following situation : a sender (S) communicates with
a receiver (R) to convince him to accept a project. On the one hand, the project
is either of high or low quality, i.e. R either wins or loses money by accepting
it. On the other hand, S is only rewarded if R accepts the project whatever its
quality.
Before communication, both agents do not know the project quality. To make
the situation more concrete, consider on the one hand that with probability 0.5
the project is of high quality and R wins rH by accepting it, and that otherwise
it is of low quality and R loses |rL| by accepting it (rL < 0). On the other hand,
S earns s if R accepts the project.
S has information that, if understood by R, tells R whether the project is of
high or low quality. Therefore, if S wants R to accept the project, S may need
to communicate with R to resolve the uncertainty about the project quality.2
The communication between S and R may either fail or succeed. The higher
their efforts to communicate, the more likely communication will succeed. If
communication fails, R does not learn anything about the project quality; he
still believes that by accepting it, he will win rH with probability 0.5 and lose
|rL| otherwise. If communication succeeds, there are two possible outcomes: R
either finds out that the project is of high quality or that it is of low quality.
After communication, R decides whether to accept the project or not.
To test the impact of monetary incentives on real communication effort choices,
each project in the experiment is represented by a master thesis : it is a high
quality project if its grade is higher than 16.5 out of 20, and it is a low quality
project if its grade is lower than 13 out of 20. Master theses were used because
participating students are familiar with the way master theses are graded.
Moreover, each experiment round is composed of two stages. In the first stage, S
has to read the master thesis and write a report to transmit information about the
2Note that R cannot evaluate the project quality without communicating with S.
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thesis quality. In the second stage, R has to decide whether to accept the project
(and to get a negative revenue if the project is of low quality and a positive one
otherwise) by reading S’s report and by comparing it to the thesis.
The participants’ efforts are measured by the time they have spent on their tasks.
Finally, to assess the impact of monetary incentives on R’s effort, the treatments
differ in rH (R’s revenue from accepting a high quality project) and/or in rL (R’s
loss from accepting a low quality project).
In such a situation, we test and show that R’s communication objective and
effort depend on whether the project yields R a negative expected revenue before
communication (NEG case: rH ≤ −rL) or a positive one (POS case: rH ≥ −rL).
Before developing the differences between the NEG and the POS cases, note that
R is only interested in a communication outcome that induces him to change his
mind about his project acceptance decision.
In the NEG case, R refuses the project if communication fails because his ex-
pected revenue of accepting the project is negative. R is so only interested in
learning that the project is of high quality; it is the only communication outcome
for which R accepts the project and that induces him to change his mind about
his project acceptance decision. R thus exerts a communication effort to enhance
his chance of identifying and accepting a high quality project. Therefore, since
R’s effort is costly, an increase in rH raises his effort. In the experiment, R spends
approximately 10% more time assessing the project quality when rH equals 9e
than when rH equals 3e (with rL equal to -10e). Moreover, since R should never
accept a low quality project, an increase in |rL| does not affect R’s effort.
In the POS case, R accepts the project if communication fails. R thus exerts an
effort to enhance his chance of identifying and refusing a low quality project.
Therefore, an increase in |rL| raises his effort. Moreover, since R should never
reject a high quality project, an increase in rH does not affect his effort.
By testing the validity of the models of Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) and of
chapter 2 of the thesis, we have conducted the first economic experiment offer-
ing evidence about these two communication objectives. Moreover, as far as we
know, among the economic experiments measuring real effort choices (for exam-
ple Achtziger and Alos-Ferrer, 2013; Blumkin et al., 2010; Bruggen and Strobel,
2007; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2010; and Van Dijk et al., 2001), this is the first one
investigating communication.
This experiment differs from the ones (for a review see Crawford, 1998; and for
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more recent studies see for example Cai and Wang, 2006; Sánchez-Pagés and
Vorsatz, 2009; Serra-Garcia et al., 2011; or Wang et al., 2010) testing predictions
of models on soft information (initiated by Crawford and Sobel, 1982). A major
difference with this literature is that we study verifiable information. In these
experiments, S knows with certainty the state of the world and sends a unveri-
fiable message about it to R. R then chooses an action whose consequence on S
and R’s payoff depends on the state of the world.
It also differs from the experiments (for example Dickhaut et al., 2003; Hob-
son and Kachelmeier, 2005) testing predictions of models on hard informa-
tion (pioneered by Grossman, 1981 and Milgrom, 1981). In this Hobson and
Kachelmeier’s experiment (2005), S chooses his disclosure of information strat-
egy and R infers information about his disclosure choices.
Contrary to both the literature on hard and soft information, it is considered
that communication success is endogenous to S and R’s efforts, and that the
disclosure and absorption of information are both costly since communication
requires time and devotion.
Moreover, the models of Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) and of chapter 2 of the
thesis are built upon the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion from the
psychology literature (Petty et al., 2005) in which two modes of communication
are considered: issue-relevant and cue communication. In this experiment, only
the former is studied: R carefully thinks about and examines information perti-
nent to the merits of a project in order to determine whether he should accept
or refuse it.
This chapter is organized as follows. The experimental design and procedures
are detailed in sections 2 and 3. The theoretical model and predictions are ex-
plained in section 4. Compared to Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) and chapter 2
of the thesis, the model focuses on R’s behavior. In section 5, the experimental
results are presented. Finally, in section 6, we conclude.
3.2 Experiment design
In this section, we present the important features of the experiment.3
• Group: the experiment is played in pairs of 2 participants, one playing S’s
role and the other R’s role.
3For the instructions, see appendix A.4.1.
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• Rounds, sessions and partner setting: there are 8 experiment sessions.
– In the first session, 13 participants play S’s role during 4 rounds.
– In the next 6 sessions, 59 participants first play R’s role during 4
rounds and then S’s role during 4 rounds.
– In the last session, 13 participants play R’s role during 4 rounds.
– During all 4 rounds, each receiver was matched with the same sender
of the previous experiment session. The composition of each group
was anonymous: the participants did not get to know their partner’s
identity.
This setup allows the participants not to have time-outs: R does not have
to wait for S to finish his task (see infra) to start his round.
• Projects:
– Master theses, presented in economics and management between 2009
and 2011 at the Université libre de Bruxelles, are used to represent the
projects.
– The probability that the project is of high quality is 50%.
– The quality of the project is determined by the mark of the thesis; it
is of:
∗ high quality if the mark it received is higher than or equal to 16.5
out of 20; and is
∗ low quality if the mark it received is lower than or equal to 13 out
of 20, and higher than or equal to 12 out of 20.
No theses with a grade strictly lower than 12 are used. The reason for
this is that 12 represents the passing grade in Belgian universities, and
therefore we suspect that it would have been too easy for subjects to
find out that theses with a grade strictly lower than 12 are low quality
projects.
Moreover, no theses with a grade between 13.5 and 16 were used to
create a clear distinction between low and high quality projects.
Note that a thesis with a grade higher or equal to 16.5 typically be-
longs to the upper quartile and a thesis with a grade lower or equal
to 13 typically belongs to the lower quartile.4
4Among the 464 theses presented in economics and management in 2009 and 2010 at the
Université libre de Bruxelles, 39 (8.4%) received a grade strictly lower than 12, 58 (12.5%) received
a grade between 12 and 13, and 129 (27.8%) received a grade higher than 16.5.
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– R is informed about the quality of the two previous projects at the
end of the second and of the fourth round.
By contrast, S is not informed of the quality of his projects.
• Task:
– S’s task is to convey information about the project to R through a
report.
∗ The report is presented in a structured form; there are 4 sections:
· clarity - style - structure;
· introduction - conclusion;
· originality - contribution to the existing literature; and
· analysis - methodology - documentation.
On each of these 4 sections, S can give his opinion by selecting
one out of several choices (no opinion, very good, good, medium,
bad or very bad) and he can write free text explanations.
∗ The maximum time that S can spend per round is 20 minutes.
– R’s task is to decide whether to accept or to refuse the project based
on his assessment of the master thesis. R may read S’s report and the
master thesis before his acceptance decision.
R faces 2 time limits:
∗ Before the beginning of each round, R is informed of the time that
S has spent during each of the 4 rounds. The time limit that R
can spend reading the master thesis during a round is the time S
has spent during that round divided by 2. When this time limit is
exceeded, the master thesis disappears from the computer screen,
R may however still read S’s report and decide whether to accept
the project or not.
∗ The maximum time that R can spend before taking a decision is
10 minutes. After 10 minutes, the project is automatically refused.
• Earnings:
– S earns 6 e if R accepts his project (in the model, s = 6).
– R earns an amount rH if he accepts a high quality project and gets a
negative amount rL if he accepts a low quality project.
– R and S do not earn anything if R refuses the project.
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– 8 treatments (8 different combinations of rH and rL) are used to test
the impact of financial incentives on the participants’ communication
efforts.
Table 3.1:
Payoff treatments
Case Treatment rH rL Test
NHmin 3 e -10 e ↗
N NHmax 9 e -10 e rH
E N|L|min 6 e -7 e
G N|L|max 6 e -13 e ↗
P|L|min 12 e -1 e |rL|
P P|L|max 12 e -6 e
O PHmin 9 e -4 e ↗
S PHmax 14 e -4 e rH
∗ For each role (4 rounds), each participant either faces each of the
4 treatments in the NEG case (yielding R a negative expected rev-
enue before communication), or all 4 treatments in the POS case:
PHmax, PHmax, P|L|min and P|L|max.
These treatments enable us to study the impact of an increase in
rH (rL) on R’s effort with the same value of rL (rH).
∗ The treatments NHmin (the treatment with the lowest value of
rH in the NEG case) and NHmax are either both played during
rounds 1 and 2, or both played during rounds 3 and 4. The same
holds for PHmin and PHmax. The reason for that feature is ex-
plained in the results section.
– The show-up fee depends on the experiment session type:
∗ In the first session, the show-up fee is 20 e.
∗ In the last session, the show-up fee is 12.5 e.
∗ In the other sessions, the show-up fee is 15 e.
∗ Additionaly, in all the sessions except the first one, participants
earn an amount of money that depends on:
- the number of low quality projects the participant faces when
playing R’s role; and on
- whether the participant is in the NEG or POS case when playing
R’s role.
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Table 3.2:
Lump-Sum Earnings:
additional amount of money earned
Number of low quality R’s
projects faced during case
the first 4 rounds NEG POS
0 0 e 0 e
1 13 e 6 e
2 23 e 10 e
3 33 e 14 e
4 40 e 15 e
For example, the earnings of a participant who faces four low quality
projects in the NEG case when playing R’s role are increased by 40e.
This enables to compensate R for his potential losses from accepting
one or several low quality projects.
The participants were informed about the 5 possible show-up fees. It
is only after having played the four R rounds that the participant could
find out his exact show-up fee. Putting it differently, the participants
could not deduce from the instructions the number of low quality
projects they would face.
• Cost:
Participants bear a monetary cost that depends on the time spent on their
task:
– S loses 1 cent per 20 seconds;
– R loses 1 cent per 10 seconds.
For example, if a participant has spent 20 minutes per round when
playing S’s role and 10 minutes per round when playing R’s role
(which represents the maximum time a participant can spend on the
experiment), he loses 4.8 e which is compensated by the show-up fee.
This feature ensures that S and R’s communication is costly.
All the questions asked in the post-experiment questionnaire are presented in
appendix A.4.4.
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3.3 Procedures
The experiment took place at the Université libre de Bruxelles in April 2012.
There were 72 groups and 85 participants5 from the economics or management
disciplines of different levels (from bachelor year 2 to master year 2). The par-
ticipants were recruited by e-mail and during courses with the announcement
that, depending on their decisions and on those of other participants, they could
earn a substantial amount of money during the experiment.
Each participant was asked to read the instructions individually, to fill in two
control questionnaires (presented in appendices A.4.2 and A.4.3, one concerning
R’s task and the other concerning S’s task), to play four practice rounds (three
rounds as R6, and one round as S), to play four experiment rounds as R and 4
rounds as S, and finally to fill a post-experiment questionnaire.7 The participants
played the experiment in the same computer room but were isolated from one
another.
On average, the experiment lasted 80 minutes. Payments per participant were
on average 48.71 e (64.37 $), with a minimum of 22.12 e and a maximum of
72.81 e. The average age was 21.75, with a minimum of 19 and a maximum of
31. There were 28 women and 57 men among the 85 participants.
Finally, 20 master theses were used: 4 to run the practice rounds and 16 to run
the experiment rounds.8
More information on the treatment and project allocations is presented in ap-
pendix A.4.5.
3.4 Model and predictions
In this section, I first present the model before looking at R’s strategy, character-
izing the equilibria and stating the predictions tested in the experiment.
513 participants only played the sender’s role; another 13 participants only played the re-
ceiver’s role; and 59 participants played both roles.
6When the participants practiced R’s role, the three S reports were written by PhD students
who had tested the experiment.
7Except for the participants of the first experiment session who only play S’s role during 4
rounds and only filled the control questionnaire concerning S’s task, and for the participants of
the last experiment session who only play R’s role during 4 rounds and only filled the control
questionnaire concerning R’s task.
8The references of the master theses are available on request.
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3.4.1 Model setup
There are two agents: S, the sender, proposes a project to R, the receiver. R is the
decision maker and has two possible choices: refusing or accepting the project.
If R refuses the project, both agents get zero revenue.
If R accepts the project, S earns a positive revenue s but this might lead to a loss
for R.
More specifically, R’s revenue r from accepting the project is either rH or rL,
with rH > 0 > rL. Parameters rH and rL respectively represent R’s revenue from
accepting a high and that from accepting a low quality project. Moreover, the
probability of rH before communication is 0.5.
The sequential structure is the following:
Stage 1: S exerts his effort eS ∈ [0, 1200]. S chooses the time, measured in sec-
onds, he spends reading the master thesis and writing his report. The maximum
time S can spend is 20 minutes.
Stage 2: R observes eS and then chooses his effort eR ∈ [0, b(eS)]. R observes
the time S has spent before each round, and then chooses the time he will spend
and the attention he will pay to assess the project quality. R’s effort choice upper
bound b(eS) depends positively on eS since the time limit that R can spend
reading the master thesis is half the time spent by S during that round.
Communication may enable R to learn the project quality; it may help R to figure
out whether or not to accept the project.
Moreover, communication involves increasing and convex costs C(eR) for R.
There are no communication setup costs and R’s marginal cost of effort is equal
to zero when R does not communicate. C(eR) is assumed to be continuous and
differentiable on [0, b(eS)).
Stage 3: The agents’ efforts and pure chance then determine the communication
outcome j:
1) with probability p, communication succeeds and R finds out the project qual-
ity:
i) with probability 0.5, R learns that the project is of high quality, j = H;
ii) with probability 0.5, R finds out that the project is of low quality, j = L.
2) with probability 1− p, communication fails and R does not find out the project
quality, j = F. R still believes that the project is of high quality with probability
0.5;
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The higher R and/or S’s efforts, the higher the probability of communication
success p: ∂p∂eS (
∂p
∂eR
) is strictly positive if eR 6= 0 (eS 6= 0), and equals 0 otherwise.
Communication is more likely to succeed when S spends more time explaining
the master thesis and also when R pays more attention reading S’s report and
the master thesis. It is also assumed that p equals zero if S and/or R does not
communicate (p = 0 if min {eS, eR} = 0) and that p is concave in eS and in eR
(∂
2 p
∂e2R
and ∂
2 p
∂e2S
are negative).
Stage 4: R decides whether to accept the project or not. R chooses his project
acceptance decision aj : the variable aj is equal to 1 if R accepts the project after
communication outcome j, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Finally, R’s utility U is equal to E(Π) − C(eR) where E(Π) represents R’s ex-
pected revenue.
3.4.2 R’s strategy
R’s strategy combines two variables: his effort (a function of S’s effort) and his
project acceptance decisions for each possible communication outcome.
Let us first look at R’s project acceptance decision in stage 4 after each possible
communication outcome:
1.i) If R finds out that the project is of high quality (j = H), R strictly prefers to
accept the project (aH = 1).
1.ii) If R learns that the project is of low quality (j = L), R strictly prefers to reject
the project (aL = 0).
The classes of strategies playing aH = 0 and/or aL = 1 are therefore strictly
dominated or equivalent to a strategy playing action aH = 1 and aL = 0.
2) If communication fails (j = F) and if the project yields R a negative (positive)
expected payoff, R prefers to reject (accept) the project. As it will turn out, R’s
effort choice depends on his project acceptance decision when communication
fails.
This variable aF influences R’s expected revenue in the following way:
E(Π) =
{
0.5 p rH i f aF = 0;
0.5 rH + 0.5 rL(1− p) i f aF = 1.
When aF = 0, R earns revenue rH if communication is successful (with probabil-
ity p) and if the project is of high quality (with probability 0.5).
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When aF = 1, R always accepts the project yielding him an expected revenue
0.5rH + 0.5rL unless R learns that the project is of low quality (with probability
0.5p).
3.4.3 Predictions
Predictions are derived from Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) and from chapter 2
of the thesis.
We will test whether R’s communication objective depends on whether R is in
the NEG or POS case. Before doing so, let us present the possible equilibria.
I) The NEG equilibrium: R communicates and accepts the project if and only if
he finds out that it is of high quality (aF∗ = 0).
In this equilibrium, R’s utility is: U = 0.5prH − C(e∗R).
Therefore, R’s optimal effort e∗R equals b(eS) if limeR→b(eS)
0.5rH
∂p
∂eR
(eR)− ∂C∂eR (eR) > 0
and to e∗∗R , which is implicitly given by
∂C
∂eR
(e∗∗R ) = 0.5rH
∂p
∂eR
(e∗∗R ), otherwise.
Note that R’s optimal effort depends on rH and not on rL. This means that R
communicates to increase his chance of identifying a high quality project. R is
only interested in finding out that the project is of high quality. R’s project ac-
ceptance decision when he finds out that the project is of low quality is the same
as when communication fails: he refuses the project.
II) The POS equilibrium: R communicates and accepts the project unless he
learns that it is of low quality (aF∗ = 1).
In this equilibrium, R’s utility is: U = 0.5rH + 0.5rL(1− p)− C(e∗R).
R’s optimal effort e∗R equals b(eS) if limeR→b(eS)
−0.5rL ∂p∂eR (eR)− ∂C∂eR (eR) > 0 and to
e∗∗∗R , which is implicitly given by
∂C
∂eR
(e∗∗∗R ) = 0.5 (−rL) ∂p∂eR (e∗∗∗R ), otherwise.
Note that R’s optimal effort depends on rL and not on rH. This means that R
communicates to increase his chance of identifying a low quality project. R is
only interested in learning that the project is of low quality. R’s project accep-
tance decision when he finds out that the project is of high quality is the same
as when communication fails: he accepts the project.
The NEG equilibrium exists provided that the project yields R a negative ex-
pected revenue before communication (rH ≤ −rL) and that S exerts a strictly
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positive effort (eS > 0). The POS equilibrium exists provided that the project
yields R a positive expected revenue before communication (rH ≥ −rL) and that
S exerts a strictly positive effort. This is proven in appendix A.2.2.
The NEG (POS) equilibrium exists only if R refuses (accepts) the project when
communication fails. Moreover, R only exerts a strictly positive effort if S does
so as well: it is impossible for R to find out the project quality if S does not
communicate.
This paper tests 2 main predictions.
1) Prediction of R’s effort
In the NEG (POS) case, if S’s effort is strictly positive and if we control for the
value of S’s effort,
- an increase in rH (|rL|) raises R’s effort: as illustrated in Table 3.1, R’s effort in
the treatment N|L|max and N|L|min (PHmax and PHmin) should be lower than
in the treatment NHmax (P|L|max) and higher than in the treatment NHmin
(P|L|min); and
- an increase in |rL| (rH) does not affect R’s effort: R’s effort in the treatment
N|L|max (PHmax) should not be significantly different from R’s effort in the
treatment N|L|min (PHmin).
2) Prediction of R’s project acceptance decision
Theoretically, in the NEG case, R never accepts a low quality project, since R’s
expected revenue from accepting the project is negative when communication
fails. Likewise, in the POS case, R never rejects a high quality project.
Nevertheless, this is a proxy of reality since the communication outcome is not
necessarily as clear-cut as assumed in the model. Communication can change
R’s belief about the probability that the project is of high quality to a value other
than 0 or 1. Putting it differently, after communication, R may have learned
about the project quality without being certain about it.
Therefore, we are only going to test whether R is less likely to accept low and
high quality projects in the NEG case (the treatments NHmin, NHmax, N|L|min
and N|L|max) than in the POS case (the treatments PHmin, PHmax, P|L|min
and P|L|max).
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Prediction of R’s effort
Let us first present two important variables: S and R’s efforts.
S’s effort is measured by the time spent by S during a round. There are 288
observations of S’s effort ranging from 2 to 1200 seconds. On average, S spent
336 seconds per round.
R’s effort represents the attention he pays to S’s report and the report. It is
measured by the time spent by R during a round compared to the maximum
time allotted for R to read the thesis. R’s effort is therefore equal to 2 times the
time R has spent during a round divided by S’s effort.
Because the first prediction is only true if S communicates (eS > 0), all the
observations for which S has spent less than 60 seconds have not been considered
when using R’s effort variable. Thus, we consider 272 observations of R’s effort
ranging from 1% to 202%. The mean is equal to 89%; it means that R has spent
on average 89% of the maximum time he had to read the thesis before taking his
decision.
3.5.1.1 Mean and median comparisons
Let us first compare, at the individual level, R’s effort, eR, for different values
of rH and |rL|. More precisely, we are going to consider the difference in R’s
effort for a same receiver in the following cases: i) eNHmaxR − eNHminR (the difference
in R’s effort between treatments NHmax and NHmin); ii) eN|L|maxR − eN|L|minR ; iii)
eP|L|maxR − eP|L|minR ; iv) ePHmaxR − ePHminR .
Note that the participant’s game experience is not that different in these 4 com-
parisons. This is explained by the two following experiment features:
1) The treatments NHmax and NHmin are both played during rounds 1 and 2,
or during rounds 3 and 4. The same holds for N|L|max and N|L|min; P|L|max
and P|L|min; and PHmax and PHmin.
2) R is informed about the quality of the two previous projects at the end of the
second and of the fourth rounds.
We performed two one-sided tests:
a) a one-sample t-test to assess whether the mean of the difference in R’s effort
concerning the cases i to iv is positive; and
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b) a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to assess whether the median of the difference in
R’s effort concerning the 4 cases is positive.
Table 3.3:
a) Testing whether the mean of the difference in R’s effort
between specific treatments is positive (t-test)
Case (nb of obs) Difference Prediction t-stat Pr (T < t)
i) eNHmaxR − eNHminR (34) 10.50%* + 1.47 7.53%
ii) eN|L|maxR − eN|L|minR (35) 5.06%* 0 1.32 9.75%
iii) eP|L|maxR − eP|L|minR (33) 11.63%** + 1.70 4.97%
iv) ePHmaxR − ePHminR (32) -1.72% 0 -0.29 61.39%
b) Testing whether the median of the difference in R’s effort
between specific treatments is positive (Wilcoxon signed-rank test)
Case (nb of obs) Difference Prediction z-score Pr (Z < z)
i) eNHmaxR − eNHminR (34) 10.36%* + 1.46 7.19%
ii) eN|L|maxR − eN|L|minR (35) 3.18% 0 1.05 14.725%
iii) eP|L|maxR − eP|L|minR (33) 3.03%* + 1.35 8.865%
iv) ePHmaxR − ePHminR (32) -4.78% 0 -0.56 71.26%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
i) R’s effort is on average 10.5 percentage points higher in treatment NHmax
(rH = 9 e and rL = −10 e) than in treatment NHmin (rH = 3 e and rL = −10
e). This difference is significantly positive at the 10% level; this is also verified
for the median. Therefore, as predicted, an increase in rH (of 6 e) in the NEG
case raises R’s effort.
ii) The difference in the mean of R’s effort between N|L|max (rH = 6 e and
rL = −13 e) and N|L|min (rH = 6 e and rL = −7 e) should not be significantly
positive at the 10% level. This result is the only one that contradicts the model.
According to the model, there should be neither low quality projects accepted
in the NEG case, nor high quality projects refused in the POS case. The former
explains why R should not care about the value of |rL| in the NEG case; and
the latter explains why R should not care about the value of rH in the POS
case. Therefore, we performed the same tests, as the ones presented in Table
3.3, except that we exclude the observations of the receivers in the NEG case
accepting low quality projects 50% or more of the time and of those in the POS
case refusing high quality projects 50% or more of the time (see Table 3.4). By
doing so, 18.66% of the observations are excluded.
iii) Similarly, as predicted by the model, an increase in |rL| in the POS case
from |rL| = 1 e to |rL| = 6 e (with rH = 12e) raises R’s effort: the mean
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of the difference in R’s effort between the treatments P|L|max and P|L|min is
significantly positive at the 5% level and its median is significantly positive at
the 10% level.
iv) As predicted, the mean and the median of the difference in R’s effort between
the treatments PHmax (rH = 14 e and rL = −4 e) and PHmin (rH = 9 e and
rL = −4 e) are not significantly positive at all.
Table 3.4:
a) Testing whether the mean of the difference in R’s effort
between specific treatments is positive when excluding the
observations of the receivers accepting a low quality project
in the case NEG 50% or more of the time (t-test)
Case (nb of obs) Difference (std error) t-stat Pr (T < t)
i) eNHmaxR − eNHminR (27) 15.43%** (8.45%) 1.83 3.97%
ii) eN|L|maxR − eN|L|minR (28) 3.47% (4.34%) 1.32 21.53%
b) Testing whether the mean of the difference in R’s effort
between specific treatments is positive when excluding the
observations of the receivers refusing a high quality project
in the case POS 50% or more of the time (Wilcoxon signed-rank test)
Case (nb of obs) Difference (std error) t-stat Pr (T < t)
iii) eP|L|maxR − eP|L|minR (27) 13.37%* (8.22%) 1.63 5.80%
iv) ePHmaxR − ePHminR (27) -0.09% (6.41%) -0.01 50.54%
c) Testing whether the median of the difference in R’s effort
between specific treatments is positive when excluding the
observations of the receivers accepting a low quality project
in the case NEG 50% or more of the time (t-test)
Case (nb of obs) Difference z-score Pr (Z < z)
i) eNHmaxR − eNHminR (27) 20.36%** 1.85 3.215%
ii) eN|L|maxR − eN|L|minR (28) -0.75% 0.16 43.67%
d) Testing whether the median of the difference in R’s effort
between specific treatments is positive when excluding the
observations of the receivers refusing a high quality project
in the case NEG 50% or more of the time (Wilcoxon signed-rank test)
Case (nb of obs) Difference z-score Pr (Z < z)
iii) eP|L|maxR − eP|L|minR (27) 7.19%* 1.345 8.925%
iv) ePHmaxR − ePHminR (27) -3.48% -0.22 58.56%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
We will now explain which results significantly change when excluding the ob-
servations of the receivers whose project acceptance decisions contradict the
model 50% or more of the time.
First, the difference in the mean and in the median between the treatments
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NHmax and NHmin is significantly positive at the 5% level (and not only at
the 10% level).
Second, as predicted by the model, the difference in the mean and in the median
between the treatments N|L|max and N|L|min is no longer significantly positive
at the 10% level.
To conclude, the participants whose project acceptance decisions do not contra-
dict the model tend also to be the ones whose effort varies in the same way as
predicted by the model.
3.5.1.2 Validity of the results
To assess whether the results about R’s effort are valid, we have tested:
1) whether S’s effort varies with the treatment;
2) whether for higher S and R’s efforts, communication is more likely to succeed;
3) whether S and R’s efforts vary with the project quality; and
4) whether there is a first session (the participants only play S’s role) and a treat-
ment order effects on S’s effort.
1) We have first tested whether S’s effort varies with the treatment (see appendix
A.4.6). If the project monetary incentives (rH and rL) influence S’s effort, the
differences in R’s effort in Table 3.3 might be explained by the variations in S’s
effort.
By performing a one-sample t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we have as-
sessed that an increase in rH of 5e in the POS case significantly raises S’s effort at
the 5% level. All the other differences in S’s effort are not significant. Therefore,
these tests do neither invalidate the result that an increase in rH in the NEG case
significantly raises R’s effort, nor do they invalidate the result that an increase
in rL in the POS case significantly decreases R’s effort.
2) We have tested the communication success assumption, whether for higher S
and R’s efforts, communication is more likely to succeed. The model postulates
that the higher S and R’s efforts, the higher is the probability of R accepting
a high quality project in the NEG case and the higher is the probability of R
refusing a low quality project in the POS case.
In the NEG case, by performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we have
thus tested whether S and R’s efforts depend on whether R accepts or refuses a
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high quality project. Similarly, in the POS case, we have tested whether S and
R’s efforts depend on whether R accepts or refuses a low quality project (see
appendix A.4.7).
In the NEG case, an increase in S’s effort significantly raises R’s likelihood of
accepting a high quality project at the 1% level. Moreover, R’s effort when ac-
cepting a high quality project is not significantly different from R’s effort when
refusing a high quality project. This might be explained by the significant varia-
tion in S’s effort.
In the POS case, an increase in R’s effort raises significantly his likelihood of re-
fusing a low quality project at the 5% level. Moreover, S’s effort when accepting
a low quality project is not significantly different from S’s effort when refusing
a low quality project.
Therefore, the results only give weak evidence that an increase in an agent’s ef-
fort raises the likelihood of communication success.
3) By performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we have assessed whether
S and R’s efforts vary with the project quality (see appendix A.4.8).
The median of S’s effort spent on high quality projects is not significantly dif-
ferent from the median of S’s effort spent on low quality projects (the p-value
equals 21.67%). Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that S does not de-
velop private information when communicating.
Similarly, the median of R’s effort spent on high quality projects is not signifi-
cantly different from the median of R’s effort spent on low quality projects (the
p-value equals 77.78%). Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that it is nei-
ther easier nor more difficult to communicate about a project of low quality than
about a project of high quality.9
4) Finally, by performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we have assessed
that the median of S’s effort is significantly higher when he plays in the first
session than when he plays in another session at the 5% level (see appendix
A.4.9).
Similarly by performing two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests in appendix A.4.10,
we have assessed that the medians of S and R’s efforts in the round(s) 1 (1 and
2) [3] are not significantly different from their effort(s) in the round(s) 2 (3 and
4) [4].
9Note that there are roughly the same number of low and high quality projects in each
treatment.
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3.5.2 Prediction of R’s project acceptance decision
Table 3.5 shows the number of low and high quality projects accepted and re-
fused by R.
Table 3.5:
Projects acceptance decisions
Number (percentage) of
low quality projects Accepted Refused
(1) NEG case 22 (30.6%) 50 (69.4%)
(2) POS case 41 (56.9%) 31 (43.1%)
Number (percentage) of
high quality projects Accepted Refused
(3) NEG case 43 (59.7%) 29 (40.3%)
(4) POS case 50 (69.4%) 22 (30.6%)
To test the prediction of R’s project acceptance decision, the receivers’ project
acceptance decisions, in bold in Table 3.5, are compared between the NEG and
POS cases.
More precisely, we compare, by performing a one-sample t-test and a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test,
i) the percentage of receivers accepting a low quality project between the NEG
and the POS cases;
ii) the percentage of receivers accepting a high quality project between the NEG
and the POS cases.
We run these tests first with all observations and then only with the observations
of the last two R rounds (we exclude the observations for which R does not have
much experience in assessing the master thesis quality).
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Table 3.6:
a) Test of the difference in the percentage of projects accepted
(t-test and rank-sum test)
Samples Compared Mean Difference t-stat Pr (T < t) z-stat Pr (Z < z)
(2) - (1) 26.4% *** 3.29 0.06% 3.18 0.075%
(4) - (3) 9.7% 1.22 11.27% 1.215 11.21%
b) Test of the difference in the percentage of projects accepted when
excluding the observations of rounds 1 and 2 (t-test and rank-sum test)
Samples Compared Mean Difference t-stat Pr (T < t) z-stat Pr (Z < z)
(2) - (1) (72 obs) 27.78%*** 2.46 0.83% 2.37 0.85%
(4) - (3) (72 obs) 25.0%** 2.24 1.43% 2.18 1.48%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
These tests show that:
i) A low quality project is significantly less likely to be accepted by R in the NEG
case than in the POS case, at the 1% level when considering all observations as
well as when excluding the observations of the first two rounds.
ii) A high quality project is significantly less likely to be accepted by R in the
NEG case than in the POS case, only at the 15% level when considering all
observations and at the 5% level when excluding the observations of the first
two rounds.
Combined with the results of R’s effort prediction (section 3.5.1), these results offer
some evidence concerning the validity of the model, namely the two communi-
cation objectives.10
3.6 Conclusion
The experiment shows evidence that, in a situation where S tries to convince R
to accept a project through communication, there are two communication goals.
On the one hand, if the project yields R a negative expected revenue before com-
munication, R tends to communicate to increase his chance of identifying and
accepting a high quality project. R’s communication goal is to find out whether
he would make money by accepting the project. Therefore, his communication
effort is positively influenced by his gain from accepting a high quality project.
10To get more insights on the interaction between the agents’ efforts and R’s project accep-
tance decision, we describe in appendix A.4.11 the percentage of projects accepted for different
quantiles of S and R’s efforts.
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On the other hand, if the project yields R a positive expected revenue before com-
munication, R tends to communicate to increase his chance of identifying and
rejecting a low quality project. R’s communication goal is to find out whether he
would lose money by accepting the project. Therefore, the higher his loss from
accepting a low quality project, the higher his communication effort will be.
Finally, a direction for future research is to carry out a field experiment to test
whether these results hold outside the laboratory. There are also other predic-
tions that need to be tested to offer additional evidence about these two com-
munication objectives, for example the impact of the probability of facing a high
quality project before communication on R’s effort.
44 CHAPTER 3.
Chapter 4
When is speech silver and silence
golden? A field experiment 1
Abstract
In the context of an information campaign about energy-saving projects, this
field experiment investigates and suggests that the citizens’ information process-
ing objective and effort depend on their ex ante belief about the project quality.
If without any information acquisition a citizen would reject the project, his
objective is to identify and accept a high quality project (one that raises his
utility). Because processing information is costly, the more the citizen ex ante
regards the project as of high quality, the higher his effort to grasp the campaign
information, and therefore the higher the probability that he will carry out the
project.
If without any information acquisition a citizen would accept the project, his ob-
jective is to identify and refuse a low quality project (one that lowers his utility).
The less he ex ante regards the project as of high quality, the higher his effort will
be, and therefore the higher the probability that he withdraws from his initial
plan of carrying out the project.
JEL Classifications: C70, C93, D8
1 This research has received funding from the F.R.S.-FNRS. I am especially grateful to Georg
Kirchsteiger, Carlos Alos-Ferrer, Estelle Cantillon, Marjorie Gassner and Jan Potters for their
very helpful comments and discussions.
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4.1 Introduction
The effectiveness of a public information campaign varies with the citizens’ ef-
forts to grasp the information. Moreover, acquiring information might have the
opposite effect than the one desired by the public authority: it may lead some
citizens to withdraw from their initial plan of carrying out the action promoted
by the campaign.
The impact of truthful information on someone’s beliefs is investigated in this
field experiment on an information campaign about energy-saving projects.
It studies the following situation: the public authority of the City of Brussels,
the sender (S), conveys information on an energy-saving project to a citizen,
the receiver (R). Four energy-saving projects were proposed to the participants
through a public information campaign. The information sent was controlled by
the experimenter. Finally, R’s ex ante and ex post information levels and beliefs
about each project quality were assessed by asking R, on 6 levels scales, both
before and after the information campaign:
- his subjective level of information about the costs, subsidies and gains of each
project; and
- his subjective likelihood of carrying out each project in the next 2 years.
Similarly to the Rockoff et al. results (2012)2, this paper suggests that new in-
formation exerts greater influence on posterior beliefs when it is more precise
and when information priors are less precise. R is approximately twice as likely
to acquire information (after the information campaign, R gets more informed
and changes his mind about his likelihood of carrying out the project) when S
communicates long and precise information than when S communicates short
and overview information.
Additionally, because R’s processing of information is costly, this paper shows
that information has lower influence on posterior beliefs if R holds ex ante strong
views about the project quality than if he holds a less clear-cut view. The rea-
son is that R is more likely to change his mind about whether to carry out the
project or not in the latter case than in the former (getting more informed is only
beneficial to R if information changes his mind about whether to implement the
project). Moreover, my study suggests that R’s communication objective and
effort depend on whether R would refuse or accept the project without informa-
2Rockoff et al. (2012) study the influence of providing information on teachers’ quality to
school principals.
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tion, said differently on whether R’s ex ante expected revenue from carrying out
the project is negative (NEG case) or positive (POS case).
To better explain the latter result, consider the following model3. Before the
information campaign, R does not know the project quality. R believes with
probability α that the project is of high quality and will increase his revenue by
rH, and that otherwise it is of low quality and will decrease his revenue by |rL|
(with rL < 0 < rH).
R may reduce his uncertainty about the project quality by processing the infor-
mation conveyed by S. Information might either be acquired or not by R. The
probability of R’s information acquisition depends positively on his effort to
grasp S’s information. If information is not acquired by R, he does not learn
anything about the project quality: R will still believe with probability α that the
project is of high quality and otherwise that it is of low quality. If information is
acquired by R, he receives a signal correlated with the project quality.
Before explaining the differences between the NEG and the POS cases, note that
R is only interested in an information processing outcome that induces him to
change his mind about whether to carry out the project or not.
In the NEG case, without any information acquisition R does not carry out the
project : this is the case if R tells before the information campaign that he will
(probably) not carry out the project in the next 2 years. Hence, R is only inter-
ested in receiving a signal that convinces him to accept the project. R thus exerts
a costly information processing effort to enhance his chance of identifying and
carrying out a high quality project. Therefore, the higher the value of α (R’s ex
ante likelihood of facing a high quality project), the higher the effort R exerts to
grasp S’s information, and therefore the higher the probability that he will carry
out the project. In the experiment, R is approximately almost 3 times more likely
to acquire information when R tells before the information campaign that he will
probably not carry out the project than when he tells that he will certainly not
carry out the project.
In the POS case, without acquiring any additional information R carries out the
project. Hence, R is so only interested in receiving a signal that induces him not
to carry out the project. R thus exerts an effort to enhance his chance of identi-
fying and not carrying out a low quality project. Therefore, the higher the value
of α, the lower R’s effort will be, and therefore the higher the probability that he
withdraws from his initial plan of carrying out the project, which constitutes a
possible unintended effect of an information campaign (for a review about the
3The main predictions are based on the models of chapter 2 and of Dewatripont and Tirole
(2005).
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possible unintended effects of an information campaign, see Cho and Salmon,
2007). R is more than 3 times more likely to acquire information when R tells
before the information campaign that he will probably carry out the project than
when he tells that he will certainly carry out the project.
These results confirm some predictions of the models of Dewatripont and Tirole
(2005) and of chapter 2 of the thesis. Compared to chapter 3 which has already
given some evidence about the validity of these models through a laboratory ex-
periment by assessing the impact of rH and rL on R’s effort, this field experiment
tests that of α.
Furthermore, it provides insights specific to the four energy-saving projects. For
example, it suggests that R’s ex ante belief about the project quality tends to be
negatively biased. It also shows that long and precise information better corrects
that bias than short and overview information.
Nevertheless, an important limitation of this experiment is that it relies on sub-
jective data. One must therefore take care in interpreting the results.4
Contrary to the field experiments that study the impact of norm-based (for ex-
ample Allcott, 2011; Hansmann et al., 2009) or differently framed (for example
Dupas, 2009; Ferraro et al., 2011; Huysentruyt and Lefevere, 2010) messages,
this paper is about factual and informative messages. For more literature about
field experiments on information, see for example Abrahamse et. al, 2005; Aizer,
2007; Al-Ubaydli and Lee, 2011; Ashraf et al., 2013; Bertrand et al., 2010; Daponte
et al., 1999; Duflo and Saez, 2003; Dupas, 2011; Jacobsen, 2011; Hastings and We-
instein, 2008; Reiss and White, 2008.
The paper is organized as follows. The important features of the experiment and
its procedures are presented in sections 2 and 3. The theoretical model and the
predictions tested are explained in section 4. Compared to chapter 2 of the thesis
and Dewatripont and Tirole (2005), the model focuses on R’s behavior. Besides,
the acquistion of information does not necessarily entirely solve R’s uncertainty
about the project quality. In section 5, the experimental results are detailed.
Finally, I conclude in section 6.
4The self-reported attitudes can for example be affected by the ordering of the questions
(participants attempt to provide answers consistent with the ones they have already given in
the survey), by the participants’ too little mental effort in answering the questions, by a social
desirability bias (participants might be willing to avoid looking bad in front of the experimenter),
by the unstability of participant’s attitudes over time, by the participants weak ability to forecast
their behavior, or by the participants’ reluctance to admit a lack of an attitude (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2001).
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4.2 Experiment design
4.2.1 Basics
Citizens, who enter the Population department of the City of Brussels (for ex-
ample to get their driving license or to renew their Identity Card), were invited
to participate in a survey about a public information campaign.
Each participant was first asked to fill in the pre-experiment questionnaire. Once
he had given back this questionnaire, he received an information campaign
folder and a post-experiment questionnaire.
The information campaign is about 4 energy-saving projects:
- the better insulation of the roof;
- the better insulation of the windows;
- the purchase of an energy-efficient fridge; and
- the purchase of a water-saving shower head.
4.2.2 Pre-experiment questionnaire
To assess the participants’ ex ante information level and their ex ante intention
assessment α concerning each of the 4 projects5, the participants were asked the
following questions6:
• The intention question: the participant was asked his likelihood of carry-
ing out each of the 4 projects in the next 2 years.
For each of these questions, the possible answers are: certainly not, very
probably not, probably not, yes probably, yes very probably, yes certainly
and I do not know. The way the subjects’ answers to this question are
related to the value of α will be explained in the predictions subsection. As it
will turn out, the ex ante intention assessment α is central to the theoretical
predictions.
• The information question: the participant was asked how well he feels
informed about the costs, subsidies and gains of each project.
5Parameter α has already been briefly presented in the introduction and will be more properly
explained in the model setup subsection; it is R’s ex ante probability of facing a high quality project.
6The participants who own more than one accommodation are asked to answer these ques-
tions for the accommodation in which they live.
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For each of these questions, the possible answers are: not informed at all,
badly informed, not well informed, well informed, very well informed,
perfectly informed and I do not know.
These questions measure R’s ex ante information level.
The pre-experiment questionnaire is presented in appendix A.5.1.
4.2.3 Information campaign
After having answered the pre-experiment questionnaire, the participants were
asked to read some information about the costs, subsidies and financial gains
concerning the 4 projects.
There were 2 treatments that differed in the level of information given to the
participant.
I) In the LOW treatment, the information folder contained short and overview
information about the 4 projects;
II) In the HIGH treatment, the information folder contained long and precise
information about the 4 projects.
The information given to the participants in the LOW and HIGH treatments is
presented in appendix A.5.2.
Each participant randomly faced one of these 2 treatments.
4.2.4 Post-experiment questionnaire
After having read some information about the 4 energy-saving projects, the par-
ticipants were asked to fill in the post-experiment questionnaire.
The participants were first asked the same questions as in the pre-experiment
questionnaire.
This enables to measure R’s ex post intention assessment and R’s ex post infor-
mation level. By comparing these variables with R’s ex ante intention assessment
and R’s ex ante level of information, it allows to assess whether the information
has been acquired or not by R (whether the participant gets more informed and
has changed his mind about his intention of carrying out the project).
Each participant was also asked:
- whether he is the tenant or the owner of his accommodation ;
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- whether his accommodation is a house or an apartment ;
- how well he thought that his roof and his windows are insulated, and whether
he thought that his fridge is energy-efficient ;
- the approximate level of his annual heating bill and the size of his household;
- the approximate age of his accommodation ;
- for each of the 4 projects, his financial ability to invest in it, his willingness to
pay to implement it, and whether it had already been conducted ;
- finally, if the subject wanted to participate to a prize lottery to win a gift certifi-
cate of 20 euros, he was also asked his name, his date of birth and his address.
The post-experiment questionnaire is presented in appendix A.5.3.
4.3 Procedures
The field experiment took place at the Population department of the City of
Brussels in May 2013 during 7 days. 180 subjects were recruited. They partici-
pated while waiting to be served at the Population department. They were told
that the experiment lasted between 10 and 20 minutes; in comparison, the partic-
ipants’ waiting time was typically higher than 30 minutes. Approximately, only
10% of the citizens who were asked to participate to the experiment accepted to
do so. The questionnaires and the information campaign folder were in French
and in Dutch, the official languages of Brussels.
Each participant was first asked to fill in the pre-experiment questionnaire. Only
after that task, they received the information campaign folder and the post-
experiment questionnaire.
On average, the experiment lasted 12 minutes per participant.
4.4 Model and predictions
In this section, I first present the model before looking at R’s strategy, character-
izing the equilibria and stating the predictions tested in the experiment.7
7The model tested is adapted from the ones of Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) and of chapter
2 of the thesis. It therefore differs from the economics literature on communication (for a review
see Sobel 2010) of hard information (pioneered by Grossman, 1981 and Milgrom 1981) and of soft
information (initiated by Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Contrary to this literature, it is considered
that communication success is endogenous to S and R’s efforts and that R’s effort is costly since
the absorption of S’s information requires time and devotion.
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4.4.1 Model setup
There are two agents: S, the sender/the public authority of the City of Brussels,
proposes an energy-saving project to R, the receiver/a citizen. R is the decision
maker and has two possible choices: refusing or accepting the project, carrying
out the energy-saving project or not.
If R refuses the project, it is the status quo: he gets zero revenue.
If R accepts the project, his revenue from accepting the project is either rH or rL,
with rH > 0 > rL. Parameters rH and rL respectively represent R’s revenue from
accepting a high and a low quality project. Carrying out the proposed energy-
saving project will not necessarily increase R’s utility. Moreover, the ex ante
probability of rH, called the ex ante intention assessment, is equal to α ∈ (0, 1).
If α is close to 1 (0), R is almost certain before processing information that the
project is of high (low) quality.
The sequential structure is the following:
Stage 1: S sends information q to R. This information can be of two types: S
either sends qL, short and overview information (treatment LOW), or qH, long
and precise information (treatment HIGH), with qH > qL > 0.
Stage 2: R observes q and chooses his information processing effort e ∈ [0, 1].
R’s effort represents the attention he pays and the time he spends reading and
thinking about S’s information.
S’s information may reduce R’s uncertainty about the project quality; it may help
R to figure out whether or not to carry out the project.
With probability p(e, q), R acquires some information and receives a signal cor-
related with the project quality. The higher R’s effort and/or S’s quantity of
information, the higher the probability of information processing success p: ∂p∂e
is strictly positive; and ∂p∂q is strictly positive if e 6= 0, and equals zero otherwise.
It is assumed that p equals 0 if R does not communicate (e = 0) and that p is
concave in e (∂
2 p
∂e2 ≤ 0). R is more likely to acquire information when S explains
the project better and when R pays more attention to S’s message. Moreover, it
is assumed that the higher R’s ex ante level of information, the lower the prob-
ability of that R acquires new information p(e). It is more difficult for R to get
more informed if he is already well informed.
Moreover, they are built upon the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion from the psy-
chology literature (Petty et al., 2005) which considers two modes of communication: issue-
relevant and cue communication. In this paper, only the former one is studied: R carefully
thinks about and examines information pertinent to the merits of a project to determine whether
to accept it or not.
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R’s processing of information involves increasing and convex costs C(e) for R,
with ∂C∂e (1) = ∞. There are no information processing setup costs and R’s
marginal cost of effort equals zero when R does not process any information.
C(e) is continuous and differentiable on [0, 1) .
Stage 3: R’s effort, S’s quantity of information and pure chance then determine
R’s processing of information outcome j:
1) With probability 1 − p, R’s processing of information fails, j = F. R does
not learn anything about the project quality, he still believes that the project is
of high quality with probability α. After having processed S’s information, R’s
level of information and likelihood of carrying out the project stay constant.
2) With probability p, R acquires some information and receives a signal θ. This
signal can be of two types:
i) If the project is of high quality (with probability α), R receives a signal θH
with probability β > 0.5 (j = H), and a signal θL (j = L) otherwise.
ii) If the project is of low quality (with probability 1− α), R receives a signal
θL with probability β, and a signal θH otherwise.
Therefore, R receives the signal θH with probability p [αβ+ (1− α)(1− β)] and
the signal θL with probability p [α(1− β) + (1− α)β].
It means that if R acquires some information from the campaign, R’s intention
assessment becomes more precise.
Note that if β equals 1, the signal informs perfectly R on the project quality.
Stage 4: R decides whether to accept the project or not. Without needing to
understand S’s message for a proper implementation of the project, R chooses
his project acceptance decision aj : the variable aj is equal to 1 if R accepts the
project after the information processing outcome j, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Therefore, R’s strategy combines two variables: his effort (a function of S’s quan-
tity of information) and his project acceptance decisions for each possible infor-
mation processing outcome.
Finally, R’s utility U equals E(Π) − C(e) where E(Π) represents R’s expected
revenue. If R receives the signal θH, R’s expected revenue from accepting the
project is α βrH+(1−α)(1−β)rL
α β+(1−α)(1−β) . If R receives the signal θL, R’s expected revenue
from accepting the project is α(1−β)rH+(1−α)βrL
α(1−β)+(1−α)β .
It is assumed that min
{
αrH
αrH−(1−α)rL ,
−(1−α)rL
αrH−(1−α)rL
}
< β ≤ 1 so that R strictly
prefers to accept the project if he receives the signal θH, and to refuse the project
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if he receives the signal θL.8
4.4.2 R’s strategy
R’s strategy combines two variables: his effort and his project acceptance deci-
sion for any possible information processing outcome.
Let me first look at R’s project acceptance decision in stage 4 after each possible
information processing outcome:
- If R receives the signal θH (j = H), R strictly prefers to accept the project,
aH = 1 (cf. assumption: β > −(1−α)rL
αrH−(1−α)rL ).
- If R receives the signal θL (j = L), R strictly prefers to refuse the project, aL = 0
(cf. assumption: β > αrH
αrH−(1−α)rL ).
The classes of strategies playing aH = 0 and/or aL = 1 are therefore strictly
dominated by or equivalent to a strategy playing action aH = 1 and aL = 0.
- If R’s processing of information fails (j = F) and if the project yields R a
negative (positive) expected revenue, R prefers to refuse (accept) the project,
aF = 0 (aF = 1). As it will turn out, R’s effort choice depends on his project
acceptance decision when information processing fails.
The variable aF influences R’s expected revenue in the following way:
E(Π) =
{
p[α βrH + (1− α)(1− β)rL] i f aF = 0;
αrH[1− p(1− β)] + (1− α)rL(1− pβ) i f aF = 1.
When aF = 0, R only accepts the project if information processing is successful
(with probability p) and if the signal is θH (with probability β if the project is of
high quality, and with probability 1− β otherwise). Therefore if R receives a sig-
nal θH, he earns revenue rH with probability αβ and revenue rL with probability
(1− α)(1− β).
When aF = 1, R always accepts the project yielding him an expected revenue
αrH + (1− α)rL unless R receives the signal θL.
8Note that if R receives the signal θH , R’s ex post intention assessment (the probability of
facing a high quality project after having processed S’s information) equals α β
α β+(1−α)(1−β) , which
is strictly higher than α if the last assumption is satisfied. If R receives the signal θL, R’s ex post
intention assessment equals α(1−β)
α(1−β)+(1−α)β , which is strictly lower than α.
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4.4.3 Equilibria
There are two types of equilibria.
I) The NEG equilibrium: R communicates and accepts the project if and only if
he receives the signal θH (aF∗ = 0).
In this equilibrium, R’s utility is:
U = p[αβrH + (1− α)(1− β)rL]− C(e∗)
Therefore, R’s optimal effort is implicitly given by:
∂C
∂e
(e∗) = α [βrH + (1− β)rL] ∂p
∂e
(e∗)
Note that R’s optimal effort depends positively on α. This means that R com-
municates to increase his likelihood of identifying a high quality project. R is
only interested in receiving the signal θH. R’s project decision when he receives
the signal θL is the same as when R’s processing of information fails: he refuses
the project.
II) The POS equilibrium: R communicates and accepts the project unless he
receives the signal θL (aF∗ = 1).
In this equilibrium, R’s utility is:
U = αrH[1− p(1− β)] + (1− α)rL(1− pβ)− C(e∗)
Therefore, R’s optimal effort is implicitly given by:
∂C
∂e
(e∗) = ∂p
∂e
(e∗) [−(1− β)αrH − (1− α)βrL]
Note that R’s optimal effort depends negatively on α. This means that R com-
municates to increase his likelihood of identifying a low quality project. R is
only interested in receiving the signal θL. R’s project decision when he receives
the signal θH is the same as when R’s processing of information fails: he accepts
the project.
A main difference between the NEG and POS equilibria is that if R changes his
view about his project acceptance decision after R’s processing of information,
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R accepts the project in the NEG case while he refuses it in the POS case.
The NEG equilibrium exists provided that the project yields R an ex ante negative
expected revenue (α ≤ −rLrH−rL ), otherwise R would accept the project when R’s
processing of information fails. The POS equilibrium exists provided that the
project yields R an ex ante positive expected revenue (α ≥ −rLrH−rL ), otherwise R
would refuse the project when R’s processing of information fails. Moreover, R
never deviates to a zero effort strategy since the marginal revenue of acquiring
information is strictly positive, and its marginal cost is zero if e = 0.
This is proven in appendix A.2.3.
4.4.4 Predictions
To derive predictions, the experimental data has first to be identified with the
variables of the theoretical model.
- R is in the NEG case if R’s answer to the intention question (R’s probability of
carrying out the project in the next two years) in the pre-experiment question-
naire is “certainly not”, “very probably not” or “probably not”;
- R is in the POS case if R’s answer to the intention question in the pre-experiment
questionnaire is “yes probably”, “yes very probably” or “yes certainly”.
R is in the NEG (POS) case if without any information acquisition R would
refuse (accept) the project: R’s expected revenue from accepting the project is
negative (positive) when R’s processing of information fails.
R’s answer to the intention question in the pre-experiment questionnaire is asso-
ciated with R’s value of the ex ante intention assessment α. It can be sorted in
the following ascending order: certainly not, very probably not, probably not,
yes probably, yes very probably and yes certainly.
Similarly, R’s answer to the information question is associated with R’s informa-
tion level. It can be sorted in the following ascending order: not informed at all,
badly informed, not well informed, well informed, very well informed, perfectly
informed.
This paper tests 2 predictions.
1) Impact of information
The more information S provides (the better S explains the project), the higher
the likelihood that R gets more informed and that R changes his mind about his
intention of carrying out the project.
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It is more likely in the HIGH treatment than in the LOW one that:
- R’s answer to the intention question in the post-experiment questionnaire differs
from the one in the pre-experiment questionnaire; and that
- R’s level of information in the post-experiment questionnaire is strictly higher
than in the pre-experiment questionnaire.
2) Two information acquisition objectives
In the NEG case, R’s information processing objective is to increase his chance
of identifying and accepting a high quality project. An increase in the ex ante
intention assessment α (the probability that the project is of high quality) thus
raises R’s effort to grasp S’s information. I will therefore test whether the higher
R’s answer to the intention question of the pre-experiment questionnaire, the
more likely R becomes more informed and changes his mind about his intention
of carrying out the project.
In the POS case, R’s objective is to increase his chance of identifying and re-
fusing a low quality project. An increase in α thus lowers R’s effort. I will
therefore study whether the higher R’s answer to the intention question of the
pre-experiment questionnaire, the less likely R gets more informed and changes
his mind about his intention of carrying out the project.
Moreover, I will study an additional question, more specific to the 4 energy-
saving projects.
3) R’s ex ante intention assessment bias
I am going to assess whether R’s ex ante intention assessment tends to be nega-
tively biased by comparing this distribution with R’s ex post one. I will assess, by
performing a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution, whether the
distribution of the ex post intention assessments first-order stochastically domi-
nates the one of the ex ante intention assessments. If so, I am also going to test
whether long and precise information (HIGH treament) better corrects that bias
than short and overview information (LOW treament).
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4.5 Results
I first define three important binary variables:
1) The intention change variable indicates whether after having read the infor-
mation campaign, R has changed his mind about his intention of carrying out
the project. It equals 1 if R’s ex ante intention assessment is different from R’s
ex post intention assessment, whatever the direction and the magnitude of that
change. It equals 0 otherwise.
For example, if R has respectively answered “certainly not” and “very probably
not” to the intention question in the pre- and post-experiment questionnaires, it
is considered that R has changed his mind about his intention of carrying out
the project.
As a reminder, R’s ex ante (ex post) intention assessment is computed using
R’s answer about the intention question of the pre-experiment (post-experiment)
questionnaire.
2) The information increase variable equals 1 if R feels more informed after
the information campaign, and 0 otherwise. R’s answer about the information
question of the pre-experiment questionnaire is compared with that of the post-
experiment questionnaire.
3) The information acquisition variable tells whether R has both increased his
level of information and changed his mind about his intention of carrying out
the project. It is equal to 1 if the intention change and information increase variables
are both equal to 1, and to 0 otherwise.
These 3 variables serve as proxies for R’s effort: the higher R’s effort, the higher
the likelihood:
- that R changes his mind about his intention of carrying out the project,
- that R gets more informed, and
- that R acquires new information.
1.7% of the 720 observations (there are 4 projects and 180 subjects) have been
excluded because of multiple answers to the intention/information questions of
the pre-/post-experiment questionnaires.
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When using these 3 variables, there are 2 ways of dealing with the observa-
tions for which R did not answer or answered “I do not know” to the inten-
tion/information questions of the pre-/post-experiment questionnaires:
- excuding them; or
- interpreting them and assigning them a value to the intention change/information
increase variables.
In this section, I have chosen to exclude them. Nevertheless, in appendix A.5.5,
I perform the statistical tests of subsections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 without excluding
those observations. Every significant difference in the results between these two
methods will be presented in this section.
4.5.1 Impact of S’s quantity of information on R’s effort
To determine whether a higher quantity of information raises R’s effort, the
means of the intention change, information increase, and information acquisition vari-
ables are compared between the HIGH and LOW treatments by performing a
two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Table 4.1:
Difference in the mean of R’s effort
between the HIGH and LOW treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Treatment Difference
3 measures of R’s effort (A) LOW (B) HIGH (B) - (A) z-stat P > |z|
231 obs. 235 obs.
1) Intention change 44.2% 49.8% 5.6% 1.22 22.38%
2) Information increase 46.3% 66.8% 20.5%*** 4.46 <0.01%
3) Information acquisition 20.8% 37.0% 16.2%*** 3.86 0.01%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
1) On average, 44.2% (49.8%) of the participants in the LOW (HIGH) treatment
change their mind about their intention of carrying out the project after the
information campaign. This difference between the LOW and HIGH treatments
is not significant at the 10% level.
2) The likelihood that R’s information level increases after the information cam-
paign is 20.5 percentage points higher in the HIGH treatment than in the LOW
treatment. This difference is significant at the 1% level.
3) R acquires some information (R both feels more informed and changes his
mind about his intention of carrying out the project) with a probability of 20.8%
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in the LOW treatment and with a probability of 37% in the HIGH treatment.
The difference between these two percentages is significant at the 1% level.
Table A.20 in appendix A.5.5.1 shows that not excluding the observations for
which R did not answer or answered “I do not know” does not change the signif-
icance levels of these tests.
These tests therefore give some support to the fact that the better S explains the
project, the higher R’s effort to grasp S’s message.
4.5.2 Two information acquisition objectives
If there are two information acquisition objectives, R’s effort (the intention change,
information increase and information acquisition variables) should depend posi-
tively on the ex ante intention assessment α in the NEG case and negatively
on α in the POS case.
Therefore, in Table 4.2, by performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, I
compare, the mean of R’s effort (the intention change, information change and in-
formation acquisition variables) for different values of the ex ante intention assess-
ment α: “certainly not” and “probably not” in the NEG case, and “yes probably”
and “yes certainly” in the POS case.
Table 4.2:
a) Test of the difference in the mean of R’s effort between the ex ante intention
levels “certainly not” and “probably not” in the NEG case (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Ex-ante intention assessment Difference
3 measures of R’s effort (a) Certainly (b) Probably (b) - (a) z-stat P > |z|
not (93 obs.) not (74 obs.)
1) Intention change 25.8% 59.5% 33.7%*** 4.38 <0.01%
2) Information increase 48.4% 67.6% 19.2%** 2.48 1.32%
3) Information acquisition 15.1% 41.9% 26.8%*** 3.87 0.01%
b) Test of the difference in the mean of R’s effort between the ex ante intention
levels “yes probably” and “yes certainly” in the POS case (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Ex-ante intention assessment Difference
3 measures of R’s effort (c) Yes proba- (d) Yes cert- (d) - (c) z-stat P > |z|
bly (126 obs.) ainly (85 obs.)
1) Intention change 50.8% 30.6 % -20.2%*** -2.90 0.37%
2) Information increase 62.7% 49.4 % -13.3%* -1.91 5.62%
3) Information acquisition 36.5% 11.8 % -24.7%*** -3.98 0.01%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
1) When considering the observations with the ex ante intention assessment “cer-
tainly not”, R changes his mind about his intention of carrying out the project in
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25.8% of the cases. In comparison, this is the case for 59.5% of the observations
with the ex ante intention assessment “probably not”. As predicted by the model,
the difference between these two percentages is significant at the 1% level.
In the POS case, the probability that R changes his mind about his intention of
carrying out the project is 20.2 percentage points lower when the ex ante intention
assessment equals “yes certainly” than when it equals “yes probably”. This
difference is significant at the 1% level.
2) An increase in the ex ante intention assessment significantly raises the prob-
ability that R becomes more informed in the NEG case at the 5% level, and
decreases it in the POS case at the 10% level. The lower significance of the test
with the information increase variable compared to those with the intention change,
and information acquisition variables could be interpreted as an information bias:
some participants tend to seek information even when it cannot affect action.
3) As predicted by the model, when the ex ante intention assessment is “certainly
not”, R acquires some new information on average 26.8 percentage points less
often than when it is “probably not”, and on average 24.7 percentage points
more often when the ex ante intention assessment is “yes probably” than when
it is “yes certainly”. These differences are significant at the 1% level.
The comparisons with the ex ante intention assessment “very probably not” in
the NEG case and with “yes very probably” in the POS case are presented in ap-
pendix A.5.4. The tests are not that convincing; this might be explained by the
low number of observations associated with these ex ante intention levels, or be-
cause too many intention levels were created in the questionnaires. Moreover, in
Table A.19 in appendix A.5.5, it can be observed that when R’s ex ante intention
assesment equals “very probably not”, the most likely R’s ex post intention ass-
esment is “probably not”. Similarly, when R’s ex ante intention assesment equals
“yes very probably” and when R’s intention change variable equals 1, the most
likely R’s ex post intention assesment is “yes probably”. Such intention changes
could be considered as noise, i.e. R has not really changed his mind about his
intention of carrying out the project.
Moreover, these tests have also been performed without excluding the observa-
tions for which R did not answer or answered “I do not know” (see Table A.21
in appendix A.5.5). The main difference with the ones obtained when exclud-
ing the “no answer” and “I do not know” answers is that an increase in the
ex ante intention assessment significantly raises the probability that R gets more
informed in the NEG case at the 1% level (and not at the 5% level anymore), and
does not significantly decrease it in the POS case (while it is significant at the
10% level when excluding the “no answer” and “I do not know” answers).
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These results give therefore some support to the validity of the model: because
processing information is costly, the higher R’s uncertainty about the project
quality, the higher the return of information, and therefore the higher his effort
to acquire information. Nevertheless, there is an alternative statistical explana-
tion concerning the results about the intention change variable. Since the partici-
pants’ priors are consistent with their posteriors (R’s ex post intention assesment
is very positively correlated with R’s ex ante intention assesment: the correlation
coefficient equals 75.03%9), the closer a prior is from an extreme, the more likely
his posterior is also close to that extreme. However, this interpretation cannot
explain the comparisons of the information increase variable.
Moreover, as a robustness check, I study whether these results depend on the
ex ante information level (see appendix A.5.6). It shows that an increase in the
ex ante intention assessment in the POS case only significantly decreases the in-
formation increase and information acquisition variables if R’s ex ante information
level equals “not informed at all”, “badly informed” or “not well informed”.
To get additional evidence, R’s effort (the intention change, information increase
and information acquisition variables) is regressed, separately in the POS and NEG
cases, on the following variables (see Table 4.3):
- R’s ex ante intention assessment10;
- R’s ex ante information level11; and
- The HIGH treatment variable that represents the quantity of information sent
by S. It is equal to 1 if R is in the HIGH treatment, and 0 otherwise. The higher
S’s quantity of information, the higher the likelihood of information acquisition.
9To calculate this correlation coefficient, I have considered that R’s ex ante (ex post) intention
assesment is equal to 1 if R has answered “certainly not ” to the intention question in the pre-
experiment (post-experiment) questionnaire, 2 if R has answered “very probably not”, 3 if R has
answered “probably not”, 4 if R has answered “yes probably ”, 5 if R has answered “yes very
probably”, 6 if R has answered “yes certainly”.
10R’s ex ante intention assessment equals 1 if R has answered “certainly not ” to the intention
question in the pre-experiment questionnaire, 2 if R has answered “very probably not”, 3 if R
has answered “probably not”, 4 if R has answered “yes probably ”, 5 if R has answered “yes
very probably”, 6 if R has answered “yes certainly”. As a reminder, note that R is in the NEG
case if R’s ex ante intention assessment is lower or equal to 3, and is in the POS case otherwise. If
the model is correct, in the NEG (POS) case, the higher R’s ex ante intention assessment, the higher
(lower) R’s effort.
11R’s ex ante information level equals 1 if R has answered “not informed at all” to the information
question in the pre-experiment questionnaire, 2 if R has answered “badly informed”, 3 if R has
answered “not well informed”, 4 if R has answered “well informed”, 5 if R has answered “very
well informed”, 6 if R has answered “perfectly informed”. The better R is already informed
about the project before R’s processing of information, the more difficult it is for R to get even
better informed. This justifies why R’s cost of effort function and the probability of information
acquisition are assumed to be respectively convex and concave in R’s effort.
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Table 4.3:
a) Logit regression of 3 measures of R’s effort in the NEG case (201 observations)
Intention change Information increase information acquisition
Coef P > |z| Coef P > |z| Coef P > |z|
(std error) (z-stat) (std error) (z-stat) (std error) (z-stat)
Ex-ante intention 0.75*** <0.1% 0.59*** 0.2% 0.90*** <0.1%
assessment (0.17) (4.43) (0.19) (3.04) (20.91%) (4.30)
Ex-ante -0.09 46.8% -1.24*** <0.1% -0.73*** <0.1%
information level (0.13) (-0.73) (0.20) (-6.16) (0.17) (-4.28)
HIGH 0.34 26.1% 0.39 26.8% 0.99*** 0.9%
treatment (0.31) 1.12 (0.35) (1.11) (0.38) (2.63)
Constant YES
Adjusted R2 8.04% 26.25% 19.24%
b) Logit regression of 3 measures of R’s effort in the POS case (265 observations)
Intention change Information increase information acquisition
Coef P > |z| Coef P > |z| Coef P > |z|
(std error) (z-stat) (std error) (z-stat) (std error) (z-stat)
Ex-ante intention -0.30** 3.7% 0.02 91.5% -0.48*** 0.7%
assessment (0.15) (-2.08) (0.18) (0.11) (0.18) (-2.68)
Ex-ante -0.20 10.9% -2.00*** <0.1% -0.72*** <0.1%
information level (0.13) (-1.60) (0.28) (-7.15) (0.16) (-4.46)
HIGH 0.20 43.0% 1.52*** <0.1% 0.79*** 0.7%
treatment (0.25) (0.79) (0.34) (4.47) (0.30) (2.68)
Constant YES
Adjusted R2 2.66% 34.23% 14.11%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
These regressions support the validity of the model.
In the NEG case, an increase in the ex ante intention assessment significantly
raises R’s effort at the 1% level, whatever the dependent variable (the intention
change, information increase and information acquisition variables).
In the POS case, an increase in the ex ante intention assessment significantly de-
creases R’s effort at the 5% level when considering the intention change variable
as the dependent variable, and at the 1% level when considering the information
acquisition variable as the dependent variable. It is only when considering the in-
formation increase as the dependent variable that the ex ante intention assessment
variable is not significant at all.
Concerning the impact of S’s quantity of information on R’s effort, contrary to
the results of the previous section, those presented in Table 4.3 shows that the
impact of the treatment (S’s quantity of information) on the information increase
is only significant in the POS case.12
12Moreover, not excluding the observations for which R did not answer or answered “I do
not know” (see Table A.22 in appendix A.5.5) only changes the significance levels of the HIGH
treatment coefficient when considering the information increase dependent variable in the NEG
case (it goes from no significance at the 10% level to a 5% significance level) and the one of the
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Except when considering the intention change as the dependent variable, new
information exerts greater influence on posterior beliefs when information priors
(the ex ante information level) are less precise.13
4.5.3 R’s intention assessment bias
To determine whether the R’s ex ante intention assessment tends to be negatively
or less positively biased compared to ex post one, let me compare the distribu-
tions of the ex ante and ex post intention assessments. I assess, by performing a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution, whether the distribution of
the ex post intention assessments first-order stochastically dominates the one of
the ex ante intention assessments (see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4:
Comparison of the ex ante and ex post intention assessments
cumulative density functions (466 obs.)
R’s ex ante or Cert- Very Proba- Yes Yes Yes
ex post intention ainly proba- bly proba- very certain-
assessment not bly not not bly probably ly
ex ante 20.0% 27.3% 43.1% 70.2% 81.8% 100%
ex post 17.4% 22.5% 36.1% 65.0% 78.5% 100%
P-value for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: 9.7%
Table 4.4 suggests that the distribution of the ex post intention assessments sig-
nificantly first-order stochastically dominates the one of the ex ante intention
assessments at the 10% level. This could either mean that R’s ex ante intention
assessment tends to be negatively biased or that R’s ex post intention assessments
are more positively biased than R’s ex ante ones due to a social desirability bias.
To get additionnal evidence, a Wilcoxon sign-ranked test and a sign test are per-
formed. Both these tests show that these distributions are significantly different
from one another at the 1% level (see Table A.24 of appendix A.5.7).
If the ex ante intention assessments tends to be negatively biased, a higher in-
formation level should better correct the bias than a lower one. By perform-
ing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, I have assessed whether the difference
between the ex post and ex ante intention assessments is higher in the HIGH
treatment than in the LOW treatment: the test is significant at the 5% level (the
p-value equals 3.43%). In the HIGH treatment, the distribution of the ex post
ex ante intention assessment coefficient when considering the information acquisition dependent
variable in the POS case (it goes from a 1% to a 5% significance level).
13These regressions therefore offer some additional evidence about Rockoff et al.’s experimen-
tal results (2012).
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intention assessments is significantly different from the one of the ex ante in-
tention assessments at the 1% level (the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed-rank is
lower than 0.01%). In comparison, in the LOW treatment, these distributions are
not significantly different from each other at the 10% level (the p-value of the
Wilcoxon signed-rank equals 12.30%).
These tests suggest that a higher level of information better corrects the negative
bias of the ex ante intention assessments. Nevertheless, one might argue that a
higher information level may reinforce the positive bias of the ex post intention
assessments because participants might be more pleased when receiving the
HIGH treatment than the LOW one.
Moreover, as shown in appendix A.5.8, there are major project differences which
imply different policy implications (if the public authority’s objective is to con-
vince the citizens to carry out the energy-saving projects). On the one hand,
concerning the better insulations of the roof and of the windows, the results
suggest that S should convey long and precise information whatever R’s ex ante
intention assessment. On the other hand, concerning the purchases of a water-
saving shower head and of an energy-efficient fridge, my results suggest that
S should communicate short and overview information if R is in the POS case,
and long and precise information otherwise.
4.6 Conclusion
The experiment offers evidence that in a situation where a sender tries to con-
vince a receiver to accept a project, the receiver may pursue two information
acquisition goals.
If the project yields R an ex ante negative expected revenue, his information ac-
quisition objective is to identify and accept a high quality project; his information
processing effort increases with the ex ante probability of a high quality project.
If the project yields R an ex ante positive expected revenue, his objective is to
identify and reject a low quality project; his effort increases with the ex ante
probability of a low quality project.
A limitation of this experiment is that it relies on self-reported data. A direction
for future research is thus to test whether these results hold with measures of
actual behavioral change. This would enable to reap considerable efficiency
gains on public information campaigns and to better address key issues in areas
such as climate change, health and education.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The thesis studies costly and truthful communication in a situation where a
sender tries to convince a receiver to implement a project. Neither the sender
nor the receiver knows ex ante the decision relevant state, I.e. whether the project
is of high or low quality. The state only becomes publicly known if communica-
tion succeeds. The likelihood of successful communication is determined by the
agents’ efforts.
It is shown theoretically in chapter 2 of the thesis that there are two alternative
communication objectives. Chapter 3 and 4 confirm the theoretical predictions.
If the receiver’s ex ante revenue of the project is negative (NEG case), the re-
ceiver’s communication objective is to find out that the project is of high quality.
Chapter 3 shows through a laboratory experiment that in the NEG case, the
receiver’s communication effort depends positively on his gain of accepting a
high quality project and is not influenced by his loss of accepting a low quality
project. Chapter 4 shows through a field experiment that in the NEG case, the
receiver’s effort depends positively on the ex ante probability that the project is
of high quality.
If the receiver’s ex ante revenue of the project is positive (POS case), the receiver’s
communication objective is to find out that the project is of low quality. Chapter
3 shows that in the POS case, the receiver’s communication effort depends pos-
itively on his loss of accepting a low quality project and is not influenced by his
gain of accepting a high quality project. Chapter 4 shows that in the POS case,
the receiver’s effort depends positively on the ex ante probability that the project
is of low quality.
The results of chapter 4 also suggest that new information has lower influence
on posterior beliefs about the project quality if R ex ante holds strong views about
it than if he holds a less clear-cut view.
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The thesis shows that differentiating the information, for example the one sent
in a public information campaign, according to the receiver’s prior belief about
the project quality may help to raise the communication efficiency.
Finally, a direction for future research would be to extend the model to a buyers-
sellers situation: buyers gather information to find out whether to buy the sell-
ers’ products. This could generate interesting implications for communication
and price strategies in markets.
Appendices
A.1 Lemma
Whatever the communication efforts (eS and eRi) chosen in the stage 1, Ri strictly
prefers playing aFi = 0
[
aFi = 1
]
provided that:
URi(aFi = 0) > [<]URi(a
F
i = 1)⇔ eSeRiα(rHi + βRs)− CR(eRi)
> [<] α(rHi + βRs) + (1− eSeRi)(1− α)(rL + βRs)− CR(eRi)⇔ α < [>] α∗Ri
This also explains why Ri is indifferent between playing aFi = 0 and a
F
i = 1 when
α = α∗Ri.
A.2 Equilibria
A.2.1 Chapter 2
A.2.1.1 Social preferences/S’s project quality incentives
I) The CH equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) R1 does not deviate to aF1 = 1 provided that α ≤ α∗R1: see Lemma 1.
2) S does not deviate to eS = 0 provided that S’s marginal revenue of effort is
strictly positive:
e∗HR1 α(s + βSrH1) > 0⇔ βS > −
s
rH1
Recall that there are no communication setup costs, and that if eS = 0, S’s
marginal cost of effort is null.
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3) R1 does not deviate to eR1 = 0 provided that R1’s marginal revenue of effort
is strictly positive:
e∗HS α(rH1 + βRs) > 0⇔ βR > −
rH1
s
Recall that there are no communication setup costs, and that if eR1 = 0, R1’s
marginal cost of effort is null.
II) The CL equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) R1 does not deviate to aF1 = 0 provided that α ≥ α∗R1: see Lemma 1.
2) S does not deviate to eS = 0 provided that S’s marginal revenue of effort is
strictly positive:
e∗LR1(1− α)(−s− βSrL) > 0⇔ βS >
s
−rL
3) R1 does not deviate to eR1 = 0 provided that R’s marginal revenue of effort is
strictly positive:
e∗LS (1− α)(−rL − βRs) > 0⇔ βR <
−rL
s
III) The H equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) R1 does not deviate to aF1 = 1 if α ≤ α∗R1: see Lemma 1;
2) R1 (S) does not deviate to a strictly positive effort because communicating
when S (R1) is not exerting any effort is useless. It decreases R1’s (S’s) payoff
and it does not affect the other agent’s revenue.
IV) The L equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) R1 does not deviate to aF1 = 0 if α ≥ α∗R1: see Lemma 1;
2) S and R1 do not deviate to a strictly positive effort (same reason as for the
previous equilibrium).
A.2.1.2 Uncertainty
First of all, note that α∗R1 ≤ α∗R2 since rH1 > rH2.
I) The CHH equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) R1 (R2) does not deviate to aF1 = 1 (a
F
2 = 1) provided that α ≤ α∗R1 (α ≤ α∗R2):
see Lemma 1.
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2) R1 (R2) [S’s] never deviates to eR1 = 0 (eR2 = 0) [eS = 0] since R1’s (R2’s) [S’s]
marginal revenue of communication is strictly positive: e∗HS αrH1 > 0 (e
∗H
S αrH2 >
0) [(λe∗HR1 + (1− λ)e∗HR2 )αs > 0].
II) The CLH equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) R1 does not deviate to aF1 = 0 (a
F
2 = 1) provided that α ≥ α∗R1 (α ≤ α∗R2): see
Lemma 1.
2) R1 (R2) never deviates to eR1 = 0 (eR2 = 0) since R1’s (R2’s) marginal revenue
of communication is strictly positive: −rLe∗LHS (1− α) > 0 (e∗LHS αrH2 > 0).
Recall that there are no communication setup costs, and that if eR1 = 0 (eR2 = 0),
R1’s (R2’s) marginal cost of effort is zero.
3) S does not deviate to eS = 0 provided that S’s marginal revenue is positive:
(1− λ)e∗H′R2 αs− λe∗LR1(1− α)s > 0⇔ α ≥ α∗S
Recall that there are no communication setup costs, and that if eS = 0, S’s
marginal cost of effort is null.
III) The HH equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) R1 (R2) does not deviate to aF1 = 1 (a
F
2 = 1) if α ≤ α∗R1: see Lemma 1;
2) R1 and/or R2 (S) do(es) not deviate to a strictly positive effort because com-
municating when S (R1 and R2) is (are) not exerting any effort is useless.
IV) The LH equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) R1 (R2) does not deviate to aF1 = 0 (a
F
2 = 1) if α ≥ α∗R1 (α ≤ α∗R2): see Lemma 1;
2) S, R1 and R2 do not deviate to a strictly positive effort (same reason as for the
previous equilibrium).
V) The LL equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) R1 (R2) does not deviate to aF1 = 0 (a
F
2 = 0) if α ≥ α∗R2: see Lemma 1;
2) S, R1 and R2 do not deviate to a strictly positive effort (same reason as for the
previous equilibrium).
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A.2.1.3 Social preferences and uncertainty
I will show that there are six possible types of equilibrium.
I) In the CHH equilibrium, S, R1 and R2 communicate to accept a high quality
project (aF∗1 = a
F∗
2 = 0).
In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = e
∗H
S e
∗H
R1 α(rH1 + βRs)− CR(e∗HR1 )
UR2 = e
∗H
S e
∗H
R2 α(rH2 + βRs)− CR(e∗HR2 )
US = e∗HS α
[
λe∗HR1 (s + βSrH1) + (1− λ)e∗HR2 (s + βSrH2)
]
− CS(e∗HS )
Therefore, R1, R2 and S’s optimal efforts are implicitly given by:
∂CR
∂eR1
(e∗HR1 ) = e
∗H
S α(rH1 + βRs)
∂CR
∂eR2
(e∗HR2 ) = e
∗H
S α(rH2 + βRs)
∂CS
∂eS
(e∗HS ) = α
[
λe∗HR1 (s + βSrH1) + (1− λ)e∗HR2 (s + βSrH2)
]
II) In the CLH equilibrium, R1 communicates to reject a low quality project and
R2 communicates to accept a high quality project (aF∗1 = 1 and a
F∗
2 = 0).
In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 =α(rH1 + βRs) + (1− α)(1− e∗LHS e∗LR1)(rL + βRs)− CR(e∗LR1)
UR2 =e
∗LH
S e
∗H′
R2 α(rH2 + βRs)− CR(e∗H
′
R2 )
US =α
[
λ(s + βSrH1) + (1− λ)e∗LHS e∗H
′
R2 (s + βSrH2)
]
+
(1− α)λ
(
1− e∗LHS e∗LR1
)
(s + βSrL)− CS(e∗LHS )
Therefore, the agents’ optimal efforts are implicitly given by:
∂CR
∂eR1
(e∗LR1) = e
∗LH
S (1− α)(−rL − βRs)
∂CR
∂eR2
(e∗H
′
R2 ) = e
∗LH
S α(rH2 + βRs)
∂CS
∂eS
(e∗LHS ) = (1− λ)e∗H
′
R2 α(s + βSrH2)− λe∗LR1(1− α)(s + βSrL)
III) In the CLL equilibrium, S, R1 and R2 communicate to reject a low quality
project (aF∗1 = a
F∗
2 = 1).
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In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = α(rH1 + βRs) + (1− α)(1− e∗LHS e∗LLR1 )(rL + βRs)− CR(e∗LLR1 )
UR2 = α(rH2 + βRs) + (1− α)(1− e∗LHS e∗LLR2 )(rL + βRs)− CR(e∗LLR2 )
US = α [s + λβSrH1 + (1− λ)βSrH2]
+ (1− α)
[
1− λe∗LLS e∗LLR1 − (1− λ)e∗LLS e∗LLR2
]
(s + βSrL)− CS(e∗LLS )
Therefore, R1, R2 and S’s optimal efforts are implicitly given by:
∂CR
∂eR1
(e∗HR1 ) =
∂CR
∂eR2
(e∗HR2 ) = e
∗LL
S (1− α)(−rL − βRs)
∂CS
∂eS
(e∗HS ) = −e∗LR1(1− α)(s + βSrL)
IV) In the HH equilibrium, S, R1 and R2 do not communicate (e∗S = e
∗
R1 = e
∗
R2 =
0), and R1 and R2 always reject the project (aF∗1 = a
F∗
2 = 0).
In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are zero.
V) In the LH equilibrium, S, R1 and R2 do not communicate (e∗S = e
∗
R1 = e
∗
R2 =
0), R1 always accepts the project and R2 always rejects the project (aF∗1 = 1 and
aF∗2 = 0).
In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = αrH1 + (1− α)rL + βRs
UR2 = 0
US = λ [s + βS (αrH1 + (1− α)rL)]
VI) In the LL equilibrium, S, R1 and R2 do not communicate (e∗S = e
∗
R1 = e
∗
R2 =
0), and R1 and R2 always accept the project (aF∗1 = a
F∗
2 = 1).
In this equilibrium, R1, R2 and S’s utilities are:
UR1 = αrH1 + (1− α)rL + βRs
UR2 = αrH2 + (1− α)rL + βRs
US = s + βS [α (λrH1 + (1− λ)rH2) + (1− α)rL]
Let me at present prove the conditions of existence of these six possible types of
equilibrium.
I) The CHH equilibrium exists provided that:
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1) R1 (R2) does not deviate to aF1 = 1 (a
F
2 = 1) provided that α ≤ α∗R1 (α ≤ α∗R2):
see Lemma 1.
2) R1 (R2) [S’s] never deviates to eR1 = 0 (eR2 = 0) [eS = 0] since R1’s (R2’s) [S’s]
marginal revenue of communication is strictly positive: e∗HS α(rH2 + βRs) > 0
(e∗HS α(rH2 + βRs) > 0) [α
[
λe∗HR1 (s + βSrH1) + (1− λ)e∗HR2 (s + βSrH2)
]
> 0].
A crucial threshold must be defined before developing the conditions of exis-
tence of the CLH equilibrium. Let α∗S =
λe∗LR1(s+βSrL)
(1−λ)e∗H′R2 (s+βSrH2)+λe∗LR1(s+βSrL)
. If R1 ex-
erts a strictly positive effort e∗LR1 with a
F
1 = 1, if R2 exerts a strictly positive effort
e∗H′R2 with a
F
2 = 0 and if betaS ≤ s−rL , the threshold α∗S represents the minimum
parameter α above which S strictly prefers to communicate.
II) The CLH equilibrium exists provided that:
1) R1 does not deviate to aF1 = 0 (a
F
2 = 1) provided that α ≥ α∗R1 (α ≤ α∗R2): see
Lemma 1.
2) R1 (R2) never deviates to eR1 = 0 (eR2 = 0) since R1’s (R2’s) marginal revenue
of communication is strictly positive: −rLe∗LHS (1− α) > 0 (e∗LHS αrH2 > 0).
3) S does not deviate to eS = 0 provided that S’s marginal revenue is positive:
(1− λ)e∗H′R2 α(s + βSrH2)− λe∗LR1(1− α)(s + βSrL) > 0
⇔ βS > s−rL or α ≥ α
∗
S
III) The CLL equilibrium exists provided that:
1) R1 (R2) does not deviate to aF1 = 0 (a
F
2 = 0) if α ≥ α∗R2: see Lemma 1;
2) R1 (R2) never deviates to eR1 = 0 (eR2 = 0) since R1’s (R2’s) marginal revenue
of communication is strictly positive: e∗LLS (1− α)(−rL − βRs) > 0
3) S does not deviate to eS = 0 provided that S’s marginal revenue of effort is
strictly positive:
−e∗LR1(1− α)(s + βSrL) > 0⇔ βS >
s
−rL
IV) The HH equilibrium exists provided that:
1) R1 (R2) does not deviate to aF1 = 1 (a
F
2 = 1) if α ≤ α∗R1: see Lemma 1;
2) R1 and/or R2 (S) do(es) not deviate to a strictly positive effort because com-
municating when S (R1 and R2) is (are) not exerting any effort is useless.
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V) The LH equilibrium exists provided that:
1) R1 (R2) does not deviate to aF1 = 0 (a
F
2 = 1) if α ≥ α∗R1 (α ≤ α∗R2): see Lemma 1;
2) S, R1 and R2 do not deviate to a strictly positive effort (same reason as for the
previous equilibrium).
VI) The LL equilibrium exists provided that:
1) R1 (R2) does not deviate to aF1 = 0 (a
F
2 = 0) if α ≥ α∗R2: see Lemma 1;
2) S, R1 and R2 do not deviate to a strictly positive effort (same reason as for the
previous equilibrium).
A.2.2 Chapter 3
I) The NEG equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) Whatever the communication efforts chosen in stages 1 and 2, R does not
deviate in stage 4 to aF = 1 provided that :
U(aF = 0) ≥ U(aF = 1)
⇔ p0.5rH − C(eR) ≥ 0.5rH + 0.5rL(1− p)− C(eR)⇔ −rL ≥ rH
2) R does not deviate to eR = 0 provided that R’s marginal revenue of effort is
strictly positive:
∂p
∂eR
0.5rH > 0⇔ eS > 0
Recall that there are no communication setup costs, and that R’s marginal cost
of effort is null if eR = 0.
II) The POS equilibrium exists if the following conditions hold:
1) Whatever the communication efforts chosen in stages 1 and 2, R does not
deviate in stage 4 to aF = 0 provided that :
U(aF = 0) ≤ U(aF = 1)⇔ −rL ≤ rH
2) R does not deviate to eR = 0 provided that R’s marginal revenue of effort is
strictly positive:
∂p
∂eR
0.5 (−rL) > 0⇔ eS > 0
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A.2.3 Chapter 4
I) The NEG equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) Whatever eS and eR chosen in stages 1 and 2, R does not deviate to aF = 1
provided that:
U(aF = 0) ≥ U(aF = 1)⇔ p[αβrH + (1− α)(1− β)rL]− C(e)
≥ αrH[1− p(1− β)] + (1− α)rL(1− pβ)− C(e)⇔ α ≤ −rLrH − rL
2) R does not deviate to e = 0 provided that R’s marginal revenue of effort is
strictly positive:
[αβrH + (1− α)(1− β)rL]∂p
∂e
(e∗) > 0⇔ β > −(1− α)rL
αrH − (1− α)rL
Recall that there are no communication setup costs, and that if e = 0, R’s
marginal cost of effort is null.
II) The POS equilibrium exists provided that the following conditions hold:
1) Whatever q and e chosen in stages 1 and 2, R does not deviate to aF = 0
provided that:
U(aF = 1) ≥ U(aF = 0)⇔ α ≥ −rL
rH − rL
2) R does not deviate to e = 0 provided that R’s marginal revenue of effort is
strictly positive:
∂p
∂e
(e∗) [−(1− β)αrH − (1− α)βrL] > 0⇔ β > αrH
αrH − (1− α)rL
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A.3 Chapter 2
A.3.1 Downward discontinuity in the agents’ efforts
When α = α∗R1, R1’s effort/marginal revenue of communication is strictly lower
in the CL equilibrium than in the CH equilibrium provided that:
e∗LS (1− α∗R1)(−rL − βRs) < e∗HS α∗R1(rH1 + βRs)
⇔e∗LS (
rH1 + βRs
rH1 − rL )(−rL − βRs) < e
∗H
S (
−rL − βRs
rH1 − rL )(rH1 + βRs)
⇔e∗LS < e∗HS
Therefore, when α = α∗R1, R1’s effort is also the same (strictly higher) in the CL
equilibrium as (than) in the CH equilibrium provided that e∗LS = e
∗H
S (e
∗L
S > e
∗H
S ).
When α = α∗R1 and when e
∗L
R1 = e
∗H
R1 , S’s effort/marginal revenue of communica-
tion is strictly lower in the CL equilibrium than in the CH equilibrium provided
that:
e∗LR1(1− α∗R1)(−s− βSrL) < e∗HR1 α∗R1(s + βSrH1)
⇔− rH1 − βSrLβR < −rL − βRβSrH1 ⇔ βSβR < 1
Therefore, when α = α∗R1, both agents’ efforts are strictly lower in the CL equi-
librium than in the CH equilibrium if βSβR < 1.
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A.3.2 R’s effort graphs
A.3.2.1 Social preferences/project quality incentives
S’s social preferences/project quality incentives and R1’s effort
A.3.2.2 Uncertainty
S’s uncertainty, and R1 and R2’s efforts
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A.4 Chapter 3
A.4.1 Instructions
Let us present the instructions handed to the participants playing in a session
different from the first and the last one. Each difference with the instructions of
the first and last sessions will be systemically detailed in a footnote. Note that
the participants were given an electronic and a paper version of the instructions.
A.4.1.1 Experiment instructions
You are part of an economic experiment; note already that the amount of money
you earn depends on:
- the decisions you and other participants make, and
- to some extent on luck.
It is important that you do not communicate with your neighbors throughout
the experiment. If you have a question, please raise your hand, an experimenter
will come to you and will answer your question privately.
Take your time to read the instructions at your own pace.
Please click on the button “next” to read the next instructions.
A.4.1.2 The basic elements of the experiment
• The experiment is played in pairs of 2 participants: a player A and a player
B.
– Player A proposes a project to player B.
– Player B decides whether to accept or to refuse the player A’s project.
• The project compensation is the following:
– Player A earns an amount z if player B accepts his project.
– Player B earns an amount x if he accepts a high quality project and
loses an amount y if he accepts a medium quality project.
If player B refuses the project, players A and B do not earn anything.
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The experiment is played 8 times: you will first play 4 rounds the
PLAYER B’s role, and then 4 rounds the PLAYER A’s role.1
The values of the amounts x, y and z are indicated, for each experi-
ment round, in the table in the bottom of the screen. We will remind
you of these amounts before the beginning of each experiment round.2
You are the player B
Round x y z
1 ... e ...e ...e
2 ...e ...e ...e
3 ...e ...e ...e
4 ...e ...e ...e
You are the player A
Round x y z
1 ... e ...e ...e
2 ...e ...e ...e
3 ...e ...e ...e
4 ...e ...e ...e
• The projects used in this experiment are master theses presented in eco-
nomics and management between 2009 and 2011 at ULB.3
The mark of the thesis, decided by the thesis jury, determines the project
effective quality. The project is of:
– High quality if the mark of the thesis is higher or equal to 16.5/20;
– Medium quality if the mark of the thesis is lower or equal to 13/20.
• At the beginning of each experiment round, your probability of facing a
high quality project is 50%. Putting it differently, you have 1 chance out
of 2 of facing a master thesis with a grade higher or equal to 16.5/20; and
1 chance out of 2 of facing a master thesis with a grade lower or equal to
13/20.
You will never face a master thesis with a grade between 13.5/20 and
16/20, or strictly lower than 12/20.
1The participants of the first (last) experiment session were given the following sentence:
“The experiment is played 4 times: you will play 4 rounds the PLAYER A’s (PLAYER B’s) role.”
2The first (second) table was not presented to the participants of the first (last) experiment
session.
3The cover sheet and the acknowledgements page of each thesis have been removed to
anonymize them. Moreover, some graphics and pictures in appendices have been deleted from
the thesis to reduce its file size.
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• Your show-up fee is 10 euros.
Moreover, independently of your decisions of accepting or refusing a project,
your experiment compensation depends on the number of medium quality
projects you face during the first 4 rounds (cf. the table in the bottom of
the screen)4:
Number of projects Additional
of medium quality faced amount of money
during the first 4 rounds you earn
0 ... e
1 ... e
2 ... e
3 ... e
4 ... e
A.4.1.3 Your task
Here are the experiment tasks:
• The player A’s task is to transmit information about the thesis to player B.
• The player B’s task is to decide whether to accept or to refuse the project
based on his assessment of the master thesis (project).
The experimenter tells the effective quality of the thesis only to player B
and only after this player has decided whether to accept or not the project.
• The transmission of information happens as follows:
– Player A may read any parts of the master thesis. For example, he can
choose only to read the table of contents, the introduction and/or the
conclusion; or to skim through the whole master thesis. At the same
time, player A can write a report on the thesis for player B.
– Player B can read the player A’s report and can also compare this
report with the thesis.
Player B then decides whether to accept or not the player A’s project.
4This additional earnings enable to compensate for the possible losses you may incur when
accepting one (or several) project(s) of medium quality (when you are player B). The participants
of the last experiment session were not given the last parenthesis.
The participants of the first experiment session were given the following bullet point: “What-
ever your actions during the experiment, your compensation is increased by 17.5e for you
presence.”
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• Players A and B face a time limit to complete their task.
– The maximum time that player A can spend on a round is 20 minutes.
By contrast, there is no minimum time.
– Player B faces 2 time constraints:
∗ Player B will be informed about the time player A has spent on
his task. This time divided by 2 will be the time limit that player
B can spend on reading the master thesis (the thesis disappears
from the computer screen as soon as the time is up).
∗ The maximum time that player B can spend on a project is 10
minutes.
• In addition to the other amounts of money, your earnings are increased by
5 euros 5 to compensate the fact that:
– Player A loses 1 cent per 20 seconds spent on a round/his task (read-
ing the thesis and writing the report for player B).
– Player B loses 1 cent per 10 seconds spent on a project/his task (read-
ing the report and the master thesis, and deciding whether to accept
or refuse the project).
A.4.1.4 Experiment timing and last details
• Before the experiment,
– You have to answer some short questions to ensure that you under-
stand the experiment instructions. Your answers to this questionnaire
do not affect your compensation.
– You will then simulate 4 rounds: 3 rounds as player B (the 3 player
A’s reports have been written by PhD students having tested the ex-
periment) and one round as player A.
Your actions during this simulation will not affect your earnings, but
it will ensure that you understand how the experiment works.
The maximum time you can spend on each round of the simulation is
10 minutes.
Contrary to the experiment, the theses you face during the simulation
are not randomly drawn, every participant will face the same projects:
two theses of high quality followed by 2 theses of medium quality.
5Concerning the participants of the first and last experiment session, this amount is 2.5 euros
instead of 5 euros.
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We will remind it to you by telling you the effective quality of the 2
previous projects at the end of the second and fourth rounds of this
simulation.
This simulation will help you to understand what differentiate a
high quality project from a medium quality project.
• The experiment is then played 8 times.6
– During the first part of the experiment, you will play 4 rounds the
player B’s role. In each round, you will evaluate a thesis by reading
the report written by a player A of the previous experiment session.
It is therefore not a student sitting currently in this room.
The composition of your pair does not change during these 4 rounds:
you will play with the same participant.
You will be informed about the effective quality of the two previous
projects at the end of the second and of the fourth round.7
– Between the first and the second part of the experiment, you will
answer some short questions to ensure that you remember the player
A’s instructions.8
– During the second part of the experiment, you will play 4 rounds the
player A’s role. In each of these 4 rounds, you can write a report
concerning the project that a player B of the next experiment session
will appraise.9
The composition of your group does not change during these 4 rounds:
you will play with the same participant.
• After the experiment, you will complete a short questionnaire.
• The composition of your two pairs (the one you form with player A during
the first 4 rounds and the one you form with player B during the last 4
rounds) is anonymous. You will not get to know the identities of your two
partners neither during nor after the experiment. Your two other partners
6The participants of the first and of the last experiment session were given the following
sentence: “The experiment is then played 4 times.”
7The participants of the first experiment session were not given this bullet point. The part of
the sentence “In the first part of the experiment,” has been removed from the instructions of the
participants of the last experiment session.
8The participants of the first and last experiment sessions were not given this paragraph.
9The participants of the last experiment session were not given this paragraph. The part of
the sentence “In the second part of the experiment,” has been removed from the instructions of
the participants of the first experiment session.
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will also not get to know your identity.10
• The 8 rounds are independent.11 There is no link between one round and
another: for example, if you face a medium quality project during the first
round, your probability of facing a high quality project during the next
round is still 50%.
• You will get your experiment compensation by cash whenever you want
from Tuesday April 24 to Friday April 27, between 10h and 18h30. We will
remind you the details (place and dates) at the end of the experiment.
• Finally, we will ask you at the end of each round the question “On a scale
from 1 to 7, do you think that the project is of high or medium quality?”.12
Your answer to this question does not affect your compensation and will
not be transmitted to any participants; besides you are not obliged to an-
swer. Nevertheless your answer will enable the experimenter to better
interpret the experiment results.
If you are done reading the instructions and that you do not have any questions,
please click on the button “Next”.
A.4.2 Player A’s control questionnaire
The objective of this questionnaire is to ensure that every participant of the ex-
periment remember the instructions of the next 4 rounds.
Your answers to this questionnaire do not affect your earnings of the experiment.
Please select the correct answers. If one or several of your answers are wrong,
the experimenter will explain why and will ensure by another exercise that you
understand the experiment.
During the next 4; 6 or 8 rounds, you will be the player A or B.
10The participants of the first [last] experiment session were given the following paragraph:
“The composition of your pair (the one you form with player B [A]) is anonymous. You will not
get to know the identity of your partner neither during nor after the experiment. Your partner
will also not get to know your identity.”
11The participants of the first and last experiment sessions were given the following sentence:
“The 4 rounds are independent.”
12The possible answers are: no opinion (0) - of medium quality with certainty (1) - very
probably of medium quality with certainty (2) - probably of medium quality with certainty (3)
- between medium and high quality (4) - probably of high quality with certainty (4) - very
probably of high quality with certainty (6) - of high quality with certainty (7).
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In each round, you will propose a project to the player B of your pair. This
player will have to decide whether to accept or to refuse your project. To help
him with that task, you dispose of the thesis and may write a report to the player
B concerning this thesis.
As a reminder, here is your payoff table of the next 4 rounds:
Amount you win
Round if player B accepts
your project
1 6 e
2 6 e
3 6 e
4 6 e
As a reminder, here is the player B’s payoff table of the next 4 rounds:
Amount earned by Amount lost by
Round the player B if he accepts the player B if he accepts
a project of high quality a project of medium quality
1 e e
2 e e
3 e e
4 e e
As a reminder, you lose 1 cent per 20 seconds spent on a projet.
Imagine that you spend 10 minutes (600 seconds) in the next round. This time
spent on the project of the next round raises or decreases your experiment com-
pensation by 0; 0.15; 0.3; 0.6; 1.5; 6; other e and enables the player B to dispose
of the thesis during 300; 600; 1200 seconds.
- If the project in the next round is of high quality and if the player B of your
pair accepts it, this decision raises or decreases your experiment compensation
by 0; 1; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 10; 12; 13; 14; other e.
- If the project in the next round is of medium quality and if the player B of your
pair accepts it, this decision raises or decreases your experiment compensation
by 0; 1; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 10; 12; 13; 14; other e.
- If the project in the next round is of high quality and if the player B of your
pair refuses it, this decision raises or decreases your experiment compensation
by 0; 1; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 10; 12; 13; 14; other e.
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- If the project in the next round is of medium quality and if the player B of your
pair refuses it, this decision raises or decreases your experiment compensation
by 0; 1; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 10; 12; 13; 14; other e.
A.4.3 Player B’s control questionnaire
This questionnaire objective is to ensure that every participant of the experiment
understand the instructions of the next 4 rounds.
Your answers to this questionnaire do not affect your experiment compensation.
Please select the correct answers. If one of your answers is wrong, the exper-
imenter will explain why and will ensure by another exercise that you under-
stand the experiment.
During the next 4; 6 or 8 rounds, you will be player A or B.
A project is of:
• High or medium quality if the grade of the master thesis is higher or equal
to 16.5/20.
• High or medium quality if the grade of the master thesis is lower or equal
to 13/20.
To help you decide whether to accept or refuse the project, you will get the
report or master thesis written by player A.
You will also be informed during each round of the time spent by player A on
the project. This time divided by 2 will be the time limit during which you can
read the report or the thesis during the round.
For example, if you have been informed in the first round that player A has spent
1000 seconds (16 minutes and 4 seconds) on the project (reading the thesis and
writing the report), you will dispose of the thesis in this first round during 500;
1000 or 2500 seconds to compare it with the report.
If you are at the end of the second or first; third; fourth or fifth round, you will
be informed at that time about the quality of the 2 previous projects; about
the title of the 2 previous theses; about the player A’s first and last names; or
about the content of the player A’s report.
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As a reminder, here is your table of revenues for the first 4 experiment rounds:
Amount won if Amount lost if
Round you accept you accept
a high quality projet a medium quality projet
1 ...e ...e
2 ...e ...e
3 ...e ...e
4 ...e ...e
As a reminder, you lose 1 cent per 10 seconds spent on a projet.
The time limit is 10 minutes per round.
As a reminder, your experiment earnings depends also on the number of medium
quality projects that you face during the first 4 rounds:
Number of projects of Additional
medium quality during amount of money
the first 4 rounds won
0 ... e
1 ... e
2 ... e
3 ... e
4 ... e
The player A’s compensation of your pair (a participant of the previous experi-
ment session) is increased by 6e for each project you accept or refuse.
Imagine that you have spent 200 seconds during the third round. This time spent
on the third project raise or decrease your experiment compensation by 0; 0,1;
0,2; 0,4; 1; 2; 4 e.
- If the project of the third round is of high quality and if you accept it, this
decision raise or decrease your experiment compensation by 0; 1; 3; 4; 6; 7; 9; 10;
12; 13; 14 e.
- If the project of the third round is of medium quality and if you accept it, this
decision raise or decrease your experiment compensation by 0; 1; 3; 4; 6; 7; 9; 10;
12; 13; 14 e.
- If the project of the third round is of high quality and if you refuse it, this
decision raise or decrease your experiment compensation by 0; 1; 3; 4; 6; 7; 9; 10;
12; 13; 14 e.
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- If the project of the third round is of medium quality and if you refuse it, this
decision raise or decrease your experiment compensation by 0; 1; 3; 4; 6; 7; 9; 10;
12; 13; 14 e.
Independently of your decisions of accepting or refusing a project, your exper-
iment compensation depends also on the number of medium or high quality
projects you face during the first 4 rounds.
For example, if you face 3 projects of medium quality during the first 4 experi-
ment rounds, your experiment compensation are increased or decreased by 0;
6; 10; 13; 14; 15; 23; 33; 40 e.
A.4.4 Post-experiment questionnaire
Please be assured that your decisions will be treated anonymously; we only need
your last and first names, your home address and your national registration
number to be able to pay you.
• Your last and first names:
• Your home address (number, street, zip code, town):
• Your national registration number:
Please answer (even briefly) the following questions that should enable us to
better understand the experiment results.
We are asking you to make a last decision that affects your compensation and
that of another participant (this is neither the player A nor the player B with
whom you have already interacted, nor a participant of this experiment session).
You receive 3 e from the experimenter. You have to decide how much of these
3 e you give to another participant knowing that the experimenter will double
the amount given to this other participant.
Example 1: if you keep 2.5 e and give 0.5 e to the other participant, your
experiment compensation is increased by 2.5 e and that of the other participant
is increased by 1 e.
Example 2: if you keep 1 e and give 2 e to the other participant, your experiment
compensation is increased by 1 e and that of the other participant is increased
by 4 e.
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Those rules are the same for every participant of the experiment.
You will therefore also receive an amount of money that depends on another par-
ticipant’s decision: your experiment compensation is increased by the amount
he gives you multiplied by 2. This other participant is different from the one to
whom you can give a share of the 3 e.
⇒ From these 3 e, you decide to give choice between 0 and 3 e with maximum
one decimal e to the other participant.
• Sex: F; M
• Age:
• Studies and year of studies:
• Score on 20 of your academic grades during the year 2010-2011:
• What is the average amount of pocket money you receive each month
(without taking into account July and August)? No opinion; between 0
and 20 e; between 21 and 50 e; between 51 and 100 e; between 101 and
200 e; between 201 and 500 e and more than 500 e
• What is the average amount of money you earn through work (without
taking into account July and August)? No opinion; between 0 and 50 e;
between 51 and 200 e; between 201 and 500 e; between 501 and 1500 e
and more than 1500 e
• Did you feel weariness during this experiment? Yes; no; no opinion
If so, when?
• When you were player B, during which round(s) have you had the feeling
that the content of the player A’s report was false?13
– Round 1: Yes; no; no opinion
– Round 2: Yes; no; no opinion
– Round 3: Yes; no; no opinion
– Round 4: Yes; no; no opinion
– Comment:
13Note that the participants of the first experiment were not asked this question as well as the
next 2 ones.
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• When you were player B, have you had negative/positive feelings towards
your partner concerning the way he wrote his 4 reports? Positive; negative;
no opinion
Comment:
• When you were player B, on what did you base your assessment of the
theses? Entirely on the report; more on the report than on the thesis;
as much on the report as on the thesis; more on the thesis than on the
report; entirely on the thesis; no opinion
• What did you read in general in the thesis (the table of contents, the exec-
utive summary, the introduction, the conclusion, the case study, the econo-
metric/statistical analysis - all the thesis diagonally)?
• Did you have the feeling that some theses were more difficult to assess
than others? Yes; no; no opinion
If so, which ones?
A.4.5 Project and treatment allocations
In the experiment, 8 projects of high quality (noted H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, H7
and H8) and 8 projects of low quality (noted L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7 and L8)
were used.
To better explain the procedures of this experiment, let me present the project
and treatment allocations of the 8 first participants (noted subjects 1 to 8, see
Table A.1) and of the participants who were matched with them when playing
R’s role (noted subjects a to h, see Table A.2).
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Table A.1:
Project allocation of the 12 first
participants (playing only S’s role)
Subject Rounds
1 2 3 4
1 H1 H2 L3 H4
2 H1 L2 H3 L4
3 L1 H2 L3 L4
4 L1 L2 H3 H4
5 H5 H6 H7 L8
6 H5 L6 L7 H8
7 L5 H6 L7 L8
8 L5 L6 H7 H8
Treatment allocation of the 12 first
participants (playing only S’s role)
Subjects Rounds
1 2 3 4
1 to 4 NHmin NHmax N|L|min N|L|max
5 to 8 P|L|min P|L|max PHmin PHmax
For example, the subject 8 faces 2 projects of low quality in the first two rounds
(with treatment P|L|min in the first round and treatment P|L|max in the second
round) and 2 projects of high quality in the last two rounds (with treatment
PHmin in the third round and treatment PHmax in the last round).
Table A.2:
Project allocation of the participants
matched with the 12 first participants
R’s role S’s role
Subject Rounds Rounds
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
a H1 H2 L3 H4 L5 L6 L7 L8
b H1 L2 H3 L4 H5 L6 H7 H8
c L1 H2 L3 L4 H5 H6 H7 L8
d L1 L2 H3 H4 L5 H6 L7 H8
e H5 H6 H7 L8 H1 L2 L3 L4
f H5 L6 L7 H8 L1 L2 H3 H4
g L5 H6 L7 L8 H1 H2 H3 L4
h L5 L6 H7 H8 L1 H2 L3 H4
Treatment allocation of the participants
matched with the 12 first participants
when playing S’s role
Subjects Rounds
1 2 3 4
a to d N|L|max N|L|min NHmax NHmin
e to h P|L|max P|L|min PHmax PHmin
In the first 4 rounds, subjects a to h were matched with subjects 1 to 8.
In a session, every 4 participants face the same treatments in the same order.
During the first 2 rounds, each of these 4 participants faces one of the 4 possible
combinations of quality in the project allocation: one participant faces 2 low
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quality projects, one faces two high quality projects, one faces a project of high
quality before one of low quality, and one participant faces a project of low
quality before one of high quality.
The same holds for the last 2 rounds: each of these 4 participants faces one of the
4 possible combinations of quality in the project allocation; but not necessarily
the same as in the first two rounds: this has been chosen randomly.
Moreover, a project was associated with a specific round; for example, the project
H3 was always played in round 3.
Except for treatments NHmin and NHmax, there were as many observations
with high quality projects as observations with low quality projects. In the treat-
ment NHmin (36 observations), there were 17 projects of high quality and 19
projects of low quality. In the treatment NHmax, there were 19 projects of high
quality and 17 projects of low quality.
Among the 72 receivers, there were:
- 2 receivers who faced 4 projects of high quality (and no project of low quality);
- 18 receivers who faced 3 projects of high quality (and 1 project of low quality);
- 33 receivers who faced 2 projects of high quality (and 2 projects of low quality);
- 16 receivers who faced 1 project of high quality (and 3 projects of low quality);
and
- 3 receivers who faced no project of high quality (and 4 projects of low quality).
Finally, let us describe the number of observations for each treatment depending
on the round.
Table A.3:
Number of observations
for each treatment
depending on the round
Treatment Round
1 2 3 4
NHmin 13 7 8 8
NHmax 7 13 8 8
N|L|min 8 8 12 8
N|L|max 8 8 8 12
P|L|min 12 8 8 8
P|L|max 8 12 8 8
PHmin 8 8 12 8
PHmax 8 8 8 12
For example, there are 12 projects played with the treatment PHmin in round 3,
i.e. 12 receivers played the treatment P|L|min in the first round and the treatment
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P|L|max in the second round. Except for the treatments NHmin and NHmax,
note that these numbers of observations are all multiples of 4 (the exceptions
are due to an encoding error). This is explained by the following treatment and
project allocation procedure: every 4 participants face the same treatments in the
same order.
A.4.6 Difference in S’s effort between different treatments
We are going to consider the difference in S’s effort for a same sender in the fol-
lowing cases: i) eNHmaxS − eNHminS (the difference in S’s effort between the treatments
NHmax and NHmin); ii) eN|L|maxS − eN|L|minS ; iii) eP|L|maxS − eP|L|minS ; iv) ePHmaxS − ePHminS .
We performed two one-sided tests:
a) a one-sample t-test to assess whether the mean of the difference in S’s effort
concerning the cases i to iv is positive; and
b) a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to assess whether the median of the difference in
S’s effort concerning the 4 cases is positive.
Table A.4:
a) Testing whether the mean of the difference in S’s effort
between specific treatments is positive (t-test)
Case (nb of obs) Difference t-stat Pr (T < t)
i) eNHmaxS − eNHminS (36) 9 0.49 31.37%
ii) eN|L|maxS − eN|L|minS (36) 4 0.20 42.32%
iii) eP|L|maxS − eP|L|minS (36) 11 0.46 32.24%
iv) ePHmaxS − ePHminS (36) 32** 1.87 3.46%
b) Testing whether the median of the difference in S’s effort
between specific treatments is positive (Wilcoxon signed-rank test)
Case (nb of obs) Difference z-score Pr (Z < z)
i) eNHmaxS − eNHminS (36) 10.5 0.78 21.83%
ii) eN|L|maxS − eN|L|minS (36) 4.5 0.629 26.48%
iii) eP|L|maxS − eP|L|minS (36) -1 -0.02 99.37%
iv) ePHmaxS − ePHminS (36) 24.5** 1.74 4.13%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
S spends on average 32 seconds more in treatment PHmax than in treatment
PHmin. This difference is significant at the 5% level, this is also verified for the
median. All other differences are not significant.
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A.4.7 Communication success assumption
Let us test the communication success assumption.
By performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we have tested whether:
a) in the NEG case, the median of S’s (R’s) effort when R accepts a high quality
project is higher than the one when R refuses a high quality project; and
b) in the POS case, the median of S’s (R’s) effort when R accepts a low quality
project is lower than the one when he refuses a low quality project.
Table A.5:
a) Difference in the median of S and R’s effort in the NEG case between
the high quality projects that are refused by R and those that are
accepted (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Median of the effort when the
Role high quality project is Difference Predic- z- Pr
a) refused b) accepted b - a tion score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
S 289 (29) 484 (43) 195*** + 2.69 0.71%
R 106% (29) 88% (43) -18% + -1.47 14.01%
b) Difference in the median of S and R’s effort in the POS case between
the low quality projects that are accepted by R and those that are
refused (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Median of the effort when the
Role high quality project is Difference Predic- z- Pr
a) refused b) accepted b - a tion score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
S 258 (31) 274 (41) 16 - 1.28 20.07%
R 104% (28) 83% (36) -20%** - -1.96 4.97%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
In the NEG case, the median of S’s effort is almost 2 times higher when R accepts
a high quality project than when R refuses a high quality project. This difference
is significant at the 1% level and confirms the model assumption. Nevertheless,
the difference in R’s effort is insignificant and positive; this might be explained
by the significant variation in S’s effort.
In the POS case, the difference in the median of S’s effort between the low quality
projects accepted by R and those refused by R is insignificant and positive.14 On
the contrary, as predicted by the model, the difference in the median of R’s effort
is negative and significant at the 5% level.
14If we exclude the observations in which S has spent less than 60 seconds, the difference is
positive and significant at the 10% level.
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A.4.8 Variation of S and R’s effort with the project quality
By performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we have tested whether
the medians of S and R’s efforts concerning high quality projects are different
from the ones concerning low quality projects (with all the observations, and
separately in the NEG and POS cases).
Table A.6:
A) Difference in the median of S’s effort between the
projects of high quality and those of low quality
(two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Median of S’s effort
Case when the project is of Difference z- Pr
a) low quality b) high quality b - a score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
NEG 312 (72) 325 (72) 13 0.66 51.10%
POS 268 (72) 287 (72) 19 1.08 27.80%
All 284 (144) 306 (144) 22 1.23 21.67%
B) Difference in the median of R’s effort between the
projects of high quality and those of low quality
(two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Median of R’s effort
Case when the project is of Difference z- Pr
a) low quality b) high quality b - a score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
NEG 96% (69) 90% (72) -6% -0.02 98.35%
POS 102% (64) 100% (67) -3% -0.36 71.95%
All 99% (133) 96% (139) -3% -0.28 77.78%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
None of these differences in S and R’s efforts between high quality and low
quality projects are significant. Therefore, nor can we reject the hypothesis that
S does not develop private information when communicating, nor can we reject
the hypothesis that it is neither easier nor more difficult to communicate about
a low quality project than about a high quality project.
To get additional evidence on whether (R believes that) S develops private infor-
mation when communicating, let me define a new variable about R’s subjective
project quality assessment. At the end of each round, the participant is asked the
following project quality evaluation question: “on a scale from 1 to 7, do you think
that the project is of high or medium quality?”. R’s quality evaluation variable
equals:
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- 1 if R has answered “of medium quality with certainty” to this question;
- 2 if R has answered “very probably of medium quality with certainty”;
- 3 if R has answered “probably of medium quality with certainty”;
- 4 if R has answered “between medium and high quality”;
- 5 if R has answered “probably of high quality with certainty”;
- 6 if R has answered “very probably of high quality with certainty”; and
- 7 if R has answered “of high quality with certainty”. All the observations
for which R has answered “no opinion” have been excluded when using this
variable.
By performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we are going to compare
S and R’s quality evaluation when S’s effort is lower than its median (e˜S) and
otherwise.
Table A.7:
A) Test of the difference in the distribution of R’s project
quality evaluation when S’s effort is strictly higher than
its median and otherwise (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Mean of R’s quality
Case evaluation when eS Difference z- Pr
(e˜S) a) ≤ e˜S) b) > e˜S b - a score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
NEG (322) 4.1 (67) 4.5 (67) 0.4* 1.68 9.30%
POS (284.5) 4.2 (62) 4.5 (63) 0.3 1.20 23.19%
All (297) 4.1 (129) 4.5 (130) 0.4** 2.55 1.09%
b) Test of the difference in the distribution of S’s project
quality evaluation when S’s effort is strictly higher than
its median and otherwise (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Mean of S’s quality
Case evaluation when eS Difference z- Pr
(e˜S) a) ≤ e˜S) b) > e˜S b - a score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
NEG (330) 4.6 (66) 4.9 (66) 0.3 1.21 22.7%
POS (286) 4.3 (67) 4.8 (65) 0.4* 1.95 5.16%
All (297) 4.5 (133) 4.9 (131) 0.4** 2.49 1.26%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
The distributions of S and R’s quality evaluation when S’s effort is lower than its
median is significantly different from the distributions when S’s effort is higher
than its median at the 5% level. This may either mean that (R believes that) S
develops private information when communicating, or that the more S commu-
nicates, the more S and R’s quality evaluation is positively biased.
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A.4.9 First session impact on S’s effort
By performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, we have tested whether the
median of S’s effort in the first experiment session is significantly different from
the one in the other sessions.
Table A.8:
Test of the difference in S’s effort
between the observations for which S plays
in the first session and the other observations
when excluding the observations for which S does
not communicate (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
S’s effort
Case when he plays in the Difference z- Pr
a) first session b) another session a - b score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
NEG 440 (20) 328 (121) 112* 1.82 6.83%
POS 347.5 (28) 278 (103) 69.5 1.48 13.83%
All 347.5 (48) 300 (224) 47.5** 2.03 4.23%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
S’s effort when he plays in the first session is significantly higher than when
he plays in another session at the 5% level. This is mainly explained by the
observations in the NEG case.
If the observations for which S does not communicate (S’s effort is lower than 60
seconds) are not excluded, the difference in S’s effort between the observations
for which S plays in the first session and the other observations is not significant
anymore.
A.4.10 Round impact on S’s effort
By performing two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, we have tested whether:
a) the medians of S and R’s efforts in the first two rounds are significantly dif-
ferent from the ones in the last two rounds;
b) the medians of S and R’s efforts in the first round are significantly different
from the ones in the second round; and
c) the medians of S and R’s efforts in the third round are significantly different
from the ones in the fourth round.
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Table A.9:
a) Test of the difference in S and R’s effort
between the first 2 rounds and the last 2 rounds
(two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Effort
Role in the rounds Difference - z- Pr
a) 1 and 2 b) 3 and 4 a - b score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
S 302.5 (144) 289 (144) 13.5 0.08 93.46%
R 92.5% (136) 99.4% (136) -6.9% -0.18 85.63%
b) Test of the difference in S and R’s effort
between rounds 1 and 2
(two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Effort
Role in the round Difference - z- Pr
a) 1 b) 2 a - b score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
S 306.5 (72) 292 (72) 14.5 0.835 40.37%
R 89.0% (68) 92.6% (69) -3.6% -0.29 77.30%
c) Test of the difference in S and R’s effort
between rounds 3 and 4
(two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Effort
Role in the round Difference - z- Pr
a) 3 b) 4 a - b score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
S 285.5 (72) 297.5 (72) -12 -0.52 60.35%
R 102.8% (68) 91.2% (67) 11.6% 1.55 12.14%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
None of these differences are significant. Nevertheless, if we had performed
one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, the median of R’s effort in round 3 would
be significantly higher than in round 4 at the 10% level.
A.4.11 Percentage of projects accepted for different quantiles of
S and R’s efforts
Let us describe the percentage of projects accepted for different quantiles of S’s
effort (the different quartiles of S’s effort and the observations for which S does
not communicate, i.e. S spends less than 60 seconds during the round) in Table
A.10, and for the different quartiles of R’s effort in Table A.11.
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Table A.10:
A. Percentage of projects accepted for different quantiles
of S’s efforts in the NEG case (number of observations)
eS ≤ 60 60 < eS ≤ 220 220 < eS ≤ 322 322 < eS ≤ 472 eS > 472
33% (3) 27% (33) 43% (37) 46% (35) 64% (36)
B. Percentage of receivers accepting the project for different quantiles
of S’s efforts in the POS case (number of observations)
eS ≤ 60 60 < eS ≤ 190 190 < eS ≤ 276 276 < eS ≤ 384.5 eS > 384.5
69% (13) 43% (23) 61% (36) 69% (36) 69% (36)
In both the NEG and the POS case, the higher the quartile of S’s effort, the
higher is the percentage of projects accepted. Nevertheless, in the POS case,
even if there is only few observations, the percentage of projects accepted when
S does not communicate (eS ≤ 60) is the same as when S’s effort is higher than
its median (276 < eS).
Table A.11:
A. Percentage of projects accepted for the different quartiles
of R’s efforts in the NEG case (number of observations)
eR ≤ 60% 60% < eR ≤ 93% 93% < eR ≤ 116% eR > 116%
46% (35) 57% (35) 42% (36) 37% (35)
B. Percentage of receivers accepting the project for different quantiles
of R’s efforts in the POS case (number of observations)
eR ≤ 67% 67% < eR ≤ 102% 102% < eR ≤ 110% eR > 110%
73% (33) 64% (33) 56% (32) 58% (33)
The percentage of projects accepted in the NEG case decreases between the sec-
ond and the third quartiles of S’s effort. Contrary to the second quartile, R may
have exceeded the time limit for reading the master thesis in the third quartile
(the impact of R exceeding that time limit on his decision to accept the project is
studied in appendix A.4.12).
In the POS case, except for the fourth quartile of R’s effort, the higher the quartile
of R’s effort, the lower the percentage of projects accepted by R.
A.4.12 The impact of R exceeding the time limit for reading the
master thesis on his decision to accept a project
By performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, let us compare the percent-
age of projects accepted when R has exceeded the limit of time allowed to read
the master thesis (i.e. R’s effort is strictly higher than 1) or when R has not ex-
ceeded that limit (i.e. R’s effort is lower than 1); we discuss the NEG and POS
cases separately.
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Table A.12:
A) Test of the difference in the percentage of projects accepted
when R’s effort is strictly higher than 1 and when
it is lower than 1 (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Percentage of projects accepted
Case when R’s effort is Difference - z- Pr
a) > 1 b) ≤ 1 b - a score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
NEG 39% (62) 51% (79) 12% 1.41 15.96%
POS 57% (67) 69% (64) 12% 1.42 15.64%
All 48% (129) 59% (143) 11%* 1.76 7.83%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
The percentage of projects accepted when R’s effort is lower than 1 (i.e. R has
not exceeded the limit of time allowed to read the master thesis) is significantly
higher of 11 percentage points (at the 10% level) than when R’s effort is strictly
higher than 1. In the NEG case, this difference can be explained by a higher
percentage of communication failures: S’s effort is significantly higher in the
former case than in the latter at the 1% level (see Table A.13).
This explanation does not hold in the POS case, otherwise R would be more
likely to accept the project when his effort is strictly higher than 1. The difference
might be explained by R’s frustration of not being allowed to read the master
thesis longer.
Table A.13:
B) Test of the difference in the median of S’s effort
when R’s effort is strictly higher than 1 and when
it is lower than 1 (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
S’s effort
Case when R’s effort is Difference - z- Pr
a) > 1 b) ≤ 1 b - a score (Z < |z|)
(nb. of obs.) (nb. of obs.)
NEG 248.5 (62) 409 (79) 160.5*** 5.93 < 0.01%
POS 241 (67) 372.5 (64) 131.5*** 5.53 < 0.01%
All 248 (129) 383 (143) 135*** 8.125 < 0.01%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
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A.5 Chapter 4
A.5.1 Pre-experiment questionnaire
Figure A.1: Pre-experiment questionnaire (page 1)
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Figure A.2: Pre-experiment questionnaire (page 2)
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A.5.2 Treatments
A.5.2.1 Treatment LOW
Figure A.3: Treatment LOW
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A.5.2.2 Treatment HIGH
Figure A.4: Treatment HIGH (page 1)
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Figure A.5: Treatment HIGH (page 2)
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Figure A.6: Treatment HIGH (page 3)
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Figure A.7: Treatment HIGH (page 4)
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A.5.3 Post-experiment questionnaire
Figure A.8: Post-experiment questionnaire (page 1)
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Figure A.9: Post-experiment questionnaire (page 2)
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Figure A.10: Post-experiment questionnaire (page 3)
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A.5.4 Comparison of R’s effort for each possible ex ante inten-
tion assessment
In Table A.14, I present the mean of the intention change, information change and
information acquisition variables for each possible value of the ex ante intention
assessment α. I will then compare each adjacent level of α both in the NEG and
POS cases, by performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, to verify whether
R’s effort (the intention change, information increase and information acquisition vari-
ables) depends positively on α in the NEG case and negatively on α in the POS
case (see Table A.15).
Table A.14:
Mean of R’s effort for each possible value
of the ex ante intention assessment in the NEG case
(a) Certain- (b) Very pro- (c) Proba-
3 measures of R’s effort ly not bably not bly not
(93 obs.) (34 obs.) (74 obs.)
1) Intention change 25.8% 61.8% 59.5%
2) Information increase 48.4% 58.8% 67.6%
3) information acquisition 15.1% 29.4% 41.9%
(d) Yes (e) Yes very (f) Yes
probably probably certainly
(126 obs.) (54 obs.) (85 obs.)
1) Intention change 50.8% 74.1% 30.6 %
2) Information increase 62.7% 51.9% 49.4 %
3) information acquisition 36.5% 44.4% 11.8 %
Table A.15:
Test of the difference in the mean
of the intention change (rank-sum test)
Samples Mean Pred- z- P >
Compared Difference iction stat |z|
(b) - (a) 36.0%*** + 3.736 0.02%
(c) - (b) -2.3% + -0.226 82.10%
(e) - (d) 23.3%*** - 2.890 0.39%
(f) - (e) -43.5%*** - -4.986 <0.01%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
In the NEG case, the probability that R changes his mind about his intention of
carrying out the project is 36.0 percentage points lower when the ex ante inten-
tion assessment is “certainly not” than when it is “very probably not”, and 2.3
percentage points lower when the ex ante intention assessment equals “probably
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not” than when it equals “very probably not”. The first difference is significant
at the 1% level while the second one is not significant.
In the POS case, the difference in the mean of the intention change between the
ex ante intention assessments “yes probably” and “yes very probably” is highly
significant and goes in the opposite direction as the one predicted by the model.
The difference in the mean of the intention change between the ex ante intention
assessments “yes certainly” and “yes very probably” is highly significant and
goes in the same direction as the one predicted by the model.
Table A.16:
Test of the difference in the mean
of the information increase (rank-sum test)
Samples Mean Pred- z- P >
Compared Difference iction stat |z|
(b) - (a) 10.4% + 1.038 29.94%
(c) - (b) 8.7% + 0.88 37.9%
(e) - (d) -10.8% - -1.354 17.56%
(f) - (e) -2.4% - -0.279 77.99%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
Every differences in the mean of the information increase go in the same direction
as predicted by the model but are not significant at the 10% level (see Table
A.16).
Table A.17:
Test of the difference in the mean
of the information acquisition (rank-sum test)
Samples Mean Pred- z- P >
Compared Difference iction stat |z|
(b) - (a) 14.4%* + 1.823 6.83%
(c) - (b) 12.5% + 1.235 21.67%
(e) - (d) 7.9% - 0.998 31.82%
(f) - (e) -32.7%*** - 4.353 <0.01%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
In the NEG case, as predicted by the model, R acquires some information on av-
erage 14.4 percentage points less often when the ex ante intention assessment is
“certainly not” than when it is “very probably not”, and R acquires some infor-
mation on average 12.5 percentage points more often when the ex ante intention
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assessment is “very probably not” than when it is “probably not”. The first
difference is significant at the 10% level, while the second one is not significant.
In the POS case, the difference in the mean of the information acquisition be-
tween the ex ante intention assessments “yes probably” and “yes very probably”
is not significant and goes in the opposite direction as the one predicted by the
model. The difference in the mean of the information acquisition between the
ex ante intention assessments “yes certainly” and “yes very probably” is highly
significant and goes in the same direction as the one predicted by the model.
A.5.5 Inclusion of some “no answer” and “I do not know” ob-
servations in the tests
Let me first describe the data by presenting the proportion of observations for
each possible combination of R’s ex ante and ex post intention assessments an-
swers.
Table A.18:
Proportion of observations for each possible combination
of R’s ex ante and ex post intention assessments answers
R’s ex post intention assessment (nb of obs.)
R’s ex ante Cert- Very Proba- Yes Yes Yes I do No
intention ainly proba- bly proba- very pro- cer- not ans-
assessment not bly not not bly bably tainly know wer
(nb of obs.) (101) (29) (72) (169) (69) (116) (65) (87)
Certainly not (134) 61% 4% 5% 5% 1% 3% 6% 13%
Very probably not (43) 9% 33% 16% 9% 12% 5% 2% 14%
Probably not (91) 5% 5% 36% 36% 5% 1% 0% 10%
Yes probably (156) 3% 6% 9% 43% 17% 12% 5% 10%
Yes very probably (62) 2% 0% 5% 35% 26% 27% 2% 3%
Yes certainly (103) 2% 0% 3% 11% 11% 63% 4% 7%
I do not know (95) 2% 1% 5% 25% 4% 8% 45% 8%
No answer (24) 0% 8% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 88%
When using the intention change variable, I still exclude in this appendix the
observations for which:
- R’s ex ante intention assessment is “I do not know” (or when R did not answer)
and R’s ex post intention assessment is “probably not”, “very probably not” or
“certainly not”; and those for which
- R’s ex ante intention assessment is “probably not”, “very probably not” or “cer-
tainly not” and R’s ex post intention assessment is “I do not know” (or when R
did not answer) because it is not clear whether R has changed his mind about
his intention of carrying out the project or not.
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Contrary to the rest of the chapter, I have considered in this appendix that R has
changed his mind about his intention of carrying out the project (the intention
change variable equals 1) if:
- R’s ex ante intention assessment is “I do not know” (or when R did not answer)
and R’s ex post intention assessment is “yes probably”, “yes very probably” or
“yes certainly”; or if
- R’s ex ante intention assessment is “yes probably”, “yes very probably” or “yes
certainly” and R’s ex post intention assessment “I do not know” (or when R did
not answer).
R is considered not to have changed his mind about his intention of carrying
out the project (the intention change variable equals 0) if R’s ex ante and ex post
intention assessments are both “I do not know” (or when R did not answer).
Table A.19:
Proportion of observations for each possible combinations
of R’s ex ante and ex post information levels answers
R’s ex post information level (nb of obs.)
R’s Not Bad- Not Well Very Perf- I No
ex ante inf- ly well infor- well ectly do ans-
information ormed infor- inf- med inf- infor- not wer
level at all med ormed ormed med know
(nb of obs.) (13) (24) (78) (309) (140) (38) (28) (78)
Not informed at all (67) 12% 10% 18% 40% 9% 1% 3% 6%
Badly informed (60) 2% 5% 13% 38% 20% 12% 0% 10%
Not well informed (227) 0% 4% 17% 48% 17% 4% 3% 8%
Well informed (203) 0% 0% 5% 51% 28% 3% 0% 11.3%
Very well informed (41) 0% 0% 0% 54% 37% 2% 0% 7%
Perfectly informed (13) 8% 0% 0% 15% 31% 46% 0% 0%
I do not know (51) 2% 4% 14% 32% 8% 6% 33% 2%
No answer (46) 2% 7% 4% 15% 9% 11% 4% 48%
I also consider that R becomes more informed when he did not answer or
answered “I do not know” to the information question of the pre-experiment
questionnaire and when he answered “well informed”, “very well informed” or
“perfectly informed” to the information question of the post-experiment ques-
tionnaire.
On the contrary, I consider that R does not get more informed in all other cases:
- R’s ex post intention assessment is “I do not know” (or when R did not answer)
- R’s ex post intention assessment is “I do not know” (or when R did not answer)
and R’s ex post intention assessment is “not informed at all”, “badly informed”
or “not well informed”.
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A.5.5.1 Difference in R’s effort between the HIGH and LOW treatments
Let me compare the means of the intention change, information increase, and infor-
mation acquisition variables between the HIGH and LOW treatments by perform-
ing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Table A.20:
Difference in the mean of R’s effort
between the HIGH and LOW treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Treatment Difference
3 measures of R’s effort (A) LOW (B) HIGH (B) - (A) z-stat P > |z|
(obs.) (obs.)
1) Intention change 44.8% (315) 48.7% (341) 3.9% 1.00 31.53%
2) Information increase 42.7% (337) 58.5% (371) 15.8%*** 4.19 <0.01%
3) information acquisition 20.0% (315) 33.4% (341) 13.4%*** 3.87 0.01%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
The results are not that different from the ones obtained when excluding the “no
answer” and “I do not know” answers.
A.5.5.2 Test of the difference in R’s effort for different ex ante intention levels
Let me compare, by performing a Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the mean of R’s effort
(the intention change, information change and information acquisition variables) for
different values of the ex ante intention assessment α: “certainly not” and “prob-
ably not” in the NEG case, and “yes probably” and “yes certainly” in the POS
case.
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Table A.21:
a) Test of the difference in the mean of R’s effort between the ex ante intention
levels “certainly not” and “probably not” in the NEG case (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Ex-ante intention assessment Difference
3 measures of R’s effort (a) Certainly not (b) Probably not (b) - (a) z-stat P > |z|
(obs.) (obs.)
1) Intention change 24.1% (108) 59.8% (82) 35.7%*** 4.97 <0.01%
2) Information increase 42.5% (134) 60.4% (91) 17.9%*** 2.63 0.85%
3) Information acquisition 13.9% (108) 41.5% (82) 27.6%*** 4.29 <0.01%
b) Test of the difference in the mean of R’s effort between the ex ante intention
levels “yes probably” and “yes certainly” in the POS case (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Ex-ante intention assessment Difference
3 measures of R’s effort (c) Yes probably (d) Yes certainly (d) - (c) z-stat P > |z|
(156 obs.) (103 obs.)
1) Intention change 57.1% 36.7% -20.2%*** -3.17 0.15%
2) Information increase 54.5% 47.6% -6.9% -1.09 27.7%
3) Information acquisition 31.4% 12.6 % -18.8%*** -3.46 0.05%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
The main differences with the results obtained when excluding the “no answer”
and “I do not know” answers are that:
- an increase in the ex ante intention assessment significantly raises the probabil-
ity that R gets more informed in the NEG case at the 1% level, and not at the 5%
level anymore; and that
- it does not significantly decrease it in the POS case (while it is significant at the
10% level when excluding the “no answer” and “I do not know” answers).
A.5.5.3 Logit regression of R’s effort on R’s ex ante intention assessment
Let me regress R’s effort (the intention change, information increase and informa-
tion acquisition variables), separately in the POS and NEG cases, on R’s ex ante
intention assessment, R’s ex ante information level and the HIGH treatment variable.
Since R’s ex ante intention assessment and ex ante information level are used as
independent variables in this regression, the observations for which R did not
answer or answered “I do not know” to the intention/information questions in the
pre-experiment questionnaire were excluded.
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Table A.22:
a) Logit regression of 3 measures of R’s effort in the NEG case
Intention change Information increase Information acquisition
Coef. P > |z| Coef. P > |z| Coef. P > |z|
204 obs. (z-stat) 237 obs. (z-stat) 204 obs. (z-stat)
(std error) (std error) (std error)
Ex-ante intention 0.77*** <0.1% 0.46*** 0.7% 0.89*** <0.1%
assessment (0.17) (4.62) (0.17) (2.71) (20.84%) (4.26)
Ex-ante -0.10 45.4% -1.03*** <0.1% -0.73*** <0.1%
information level (0.13) (-0.75) (0.16) (-6.47) (0.17) (-4.28)
HIGH 0.32 28.9% 0.64** 3.8% 1.04*** 0.5%
treatment (0.30) (1.06) (0.31) (2.07) (0.37) (2.78)
Constant YES
Adjusted R2 8.56% 20.98% 19.19%
b) Logit regression of 3 measures of R’s effort in the POS case (293 observations)
Intention change Information increase Information acquisition
Coef. P > |z| Coef. P > |z| Coef. P > |z|
(std error) (z-stat) (std error) (z-stat) (std error) (z-stat)
Ex-ante intention -0.35** 1.1% 0.13 44.2% -0.35** 3.8%
assessment (0.14) (-2.53) (0.16) (0.77) (0.17) (-2.07)
Ex-ante -0.19 11.5% -1.51*** <0.1% -0.66*** <0.1%
information level (0.12) (-1.58) (0.21) (-7.12) (0.15) (-4.45)
HIGH 0.09 69.9% 1.31*** <0.1% 0.83*** 0.3%
treatment (0.24) (0.39) (0.29) (4.48) (0.28) (2.97)
Constant YES
Adjusted R2 2.85% 26.63% 11.87%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
The main differences with the results obtained when excluding the “no answer”
and “I do not know” answers are that:
- the impact of the treatment in the NEG case on the information increase vari-
able is significant at the 5% level (while it is not significant at the 10% level when
excluding the “no answer” and “I do not know” answers); and that
- an increase in the ex ante intention assessment in the POS case significantly
decreases the probability that R acquires S’s information at the 5% level, and not
at the 1% level anymore.
A.5.6 Test of the difference in the mean of R’s effort between
different ex ante intention assessment levels for different
information levels
I consider the following 2 categories of ex ante information levels:
1) The low category includes the observations for which R answered “not in-
formed at all”, “badly informed” or “not well informed” to the information ques-
tion in the pre-experiment questionnaire;
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2) The high category includes the observations for which R answered “well in-
formed”, “very well informed” or “perfectly informed” to the information ques-
tion in the pre-experiment questionnaire.
I compare, by performing a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, in both ex ante
information levels categories, the mean of R’s effort for different values of the
ex ante intention assessment α: “certainly not” and “probably not” in the NEG
case, and “yes probably” and “yes certainly” in the POS case (see Table A.23).
These results will be compared with those in Table A.20.
Table A.23:
a) Test of the difference in the mean of R’s effort between the ex ante intention levels
“certainly not” and “probably not” for 2 categories of R’s ex ante information level
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
3 measures Ex ante infor- Ex ante intention assessment Differ-
of mation (a) Certainly (b) Probably ence z-stat P > |z|
R’s effort category not (obs.) not (obs.) (b) - (a)
1) Intention Low 28.1% (57) 61.2% (49) 33.2%*** 3.42 0.06%
change High 22.2% (36) 56.0% (25) 33.8%*** 2.68 0.74%
2) Information Low 73.7% (57) 87.8% (49) 14.1%* 1.80 7.13%
increase High 8.3% (36) 28.0% (25) 19.7%** 2.02 4.30%
3) Information Low 24.6% (57) 53.1% (49) 37.7%*** 3.00 0.27%
acquisition High 0.0% (36) 20.0% (25) 20.0%*** 2.78 0.55%
b) Test of the difference in the mean of R’s effort between the ex ante intention levels
“yes probably” and “yes certainly” for 2 categories of R’s ex ante information level
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
3 measures Ex ante infor- Ex-ante intention assessment Differ-
of mation (c) Yes prob- (d) Yes cert- ence z-stat P > |z|
R’s effort category ably (obs.) ainly (obs.) (d) - (c)
1) Intention Low 51.2% (82) 30.6% (36) -20.7%** -2.07 3.85%
change High 50.0% (44) 30.6% (49) -19.4%* -1.90 5.78%
2) Information Low 85.4% (82) 72.2% (36) -13.1%* -1.68 9.28%
increase High 20.5% (44) 32.7% (49) 12.2% 1.32 18.76%
3) Information Low 46.3% (82) 16.7% (36) -29.7%*** -3.06 0.22%
acquisition High 18.2% (44) 8.2% (49) -10.0% -1.43 15.24%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
It can be observed that R’s effort is lower in the high ex ante information category
than in the low one. This is consistent with the assumption that the higher R’s
ex ante level of information, the lower the probability of that R acquires some
information p(e). It is more difficult for R to get more informed if he is already
well informed.
The main difference with Table A.20 is that an increase in the ex ante intention
assessment in the POS case only significantly decreases the information increase
and information acquisition variables in the low ex ante information level cate-
gory.
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A.5.7 Test of the difference between the ex ante and ex post in-
tention assessments distributions
Let me perform a sign test and a Wilcoxon sign-ranked test to assess whether
the distribution of the ex ante intention assessments is significantly different from
the one of the ex post intention assessments.
Table A.24:
Test of the difference between
the distributions of the ex ante
and ex post intention assessments
(signed test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test )
a) Signed test
Number of obs. for which
the ex ante intention assessment is
equal strictly higher strictly lower P > |z|
than the ex post intention assessment
247 79 140 <0.01%
b) Wilcoxon signed-rank test (466 obs.):
the p-value is strictly lower than 0.01%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
The tests show these distributions are significantly different from one another at
the 1% level.
A.5.8 Impact for each project of the information level on R’s
intention assessment
Let me study for each project the direction in which R’s processing of informa-
tion impacts his intention assessment.
To do so, the communication outcome is decomposed in the following way:
- The positive (negative) intention change variable equals 1 if R’s ex post intention
assessment is strictly higher (lower) than R’s ex ante intention assessment, and it
equals 0 otherwise.
- The no intention change variable equals 1 if R’s ex post intention assessment does
not differ from R’s ex ante intention assessment, and it equals 0 otherwise.
In Tables A.25 and A.26, the communication outcome decomposition for each
project is compared between the LOW and HIGH treatments, by considering
separately the NEG and POS cases.
120 . APPENDICES
Table A.25:
Difference for each project in the communication
outcome decomposition between the HIGH and LOW treatments
in the NEG case (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Treatment/ No Positive Negative Nb
Project intention intention intention of
change change change obs.
(1) LOW Treatment 81.1% 15.8% 3.2% 95
a) Roof 80.0% 20.0% 0.0% 25
b) Windows 89.3% 7.1% 3.6% 28
c) Fridge 81.2% 13.6% 4.5% 22
d) Shower 70.0% 25.0% 5.0% 20
(2) HIGH Treatment 65.1% 33.0% 1.9% 106
a) Roof 67.6% 27.0% 5.4% 37
b) Windows 63.3% 36.7% 0.0% 30
c) Fridge 75.0% 25.0% 0.0% 24
d) Shower 46.7% 53.3% 0.0% 15
Difference 2 - 1 (z-stat) -16%*** (-9.7) 17%*** (2.8) -1% (-0.6)
a) Roof -12% (-1.1) 7% (0.6) 5% (1.2)
b) Windows -26%** (-2.3) 29%*** (2.7) -4%** (-2.3)
c) Fridge -7% (-0.5) 11% (1.0) -4% (-0.6)
d) Shower -23% (-1.4) 28%* (1.7) -5% (-1.4)
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
Table A.26:
Difference for each project in the communication
outcome decomposition between the HIGH and LOW treatments
in the POS case (Wilcoxon rank-sum test)
Treatment/ No Positive Negative Nb
Project intention intention intention of
change change change obs.
(1) LOW Treatment 77.9% 11.0% 11.0% 136
a) Roof 66.7% 4.8% 28.6% 21
b) Windows 78.1% 6.25% 15.6% 32
c) Fridge 80.5% 12.2% 7.3% 41
d) Shower 80.1% 16.7% 2.4% 42
(2) HIGH Treatment 61.2% 24.0% 14.7% 129
a) Roof 56.25% 43.75% 0.0% 16
b) Windows 67.6% 20.6% 11.8% 34
c) Fridge 62.5% 12.5% 25.0% 40
d) Shower 56.4% 30.8% 12.8% 39
Difference 2 - 1 (z-stat) -17%*** (-2.9) 13%*** (2.8) 4% (0.9)
a) Roof -10% (-0.6) 39%*** (2.8) -29% (-0.6)
b) Windows -10% (-0.9) 14%* (1.7) -4%** (-2.0)
c) Fridge -18%* (-1.8) 0% (0.0) 18%*** (3.4)
d) Shower -24%** (2.4) 14% (1.5) 10%** (2.4)
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
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On the one hand, Tables A.25 and A.26 show that there are on average signif-
icantly more positive intention changes in the HIGH treatment than in the LOW
one, both in the NEG and POS cases. On the other hand, the difference in the
negative intention change between the HIGH and LOW treatments is not signif-
icant at the 10% level, both in the NEG and POS cases. These results suggest
that if the public authority’s objective is to convince the citizens to carry out the
energy-saving project, this authority should send a high quantity of information
whatever the value of the ex ante intention assessment α.
Nevertheless, there are major projects differences. Interestingly, in the POS case,
there are significantly more negative intention changes in the HIGH treatment than
in the LOW one concerning the purchases of a water-saving shower head and
of an energy-efficient fridge. In the NEG case, it is mainly the better insulation
of the windows that explains the difference in positive intention changes. Note
however that the number of observations for each project is low.
Moreover, it can also be observed that there are much more observations con-
cerning the better insulation of the roof in the NEG case than in the POS case.
The opposite holds concerning the purchase of a water-saving shower head and
the one of an energy-efficient fridge.
To get additional evidence, let me regress the positive intention change on the
treatment, the ex ante intention assessment and dummies representing the project
type.
In this regression, I only consider the observations for which communication
has succeeded (the information acquisition variable equals 1) and for which R’s
ex ante intention assessment is different from 1 (“certainly not”) and 6 (“yes
certainly”).
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Table A.27:
Logit regression of
R’s positive intention change
Coef P > |z|
(std error) (z-stat)
111 observations
Treatment 0.79* 9.8%
(0.48) (1.66)
Intention -0.84*** 0.5%
assessment (0.29) (-2.84)
Constant YES
Project dummies YES
Adjusted R2 14.48%
*** Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* Significant at the 10% level.
As predicted by the model, the higher the ex ante intention assessment α, the
lower the probability of a positive intention change.
As in Tables A.25 and A.26, the regression of Table shows that the higher the
quantity of information sent by S, the higher the probability of a positive inten-
tion change compared to a negative one.
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